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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is derived from Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2.
V
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309 define a "significant" injury such that a person
who meets the statutory threshold of § 31 A-22-309 is entitled to recover more than "nominal
damages?"
2. Can a jury lawfully award only nominal damages to a person who has injuries which
exceed the statutory threshold for serious injury established by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22309?
3. Can a jury lawfully award damages for medical expenses in an amount less than the
amount testified to by medical experts as reasonable and necessary when there is no evidence
to contradict such testimony?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. France to testify at trial as an
expert witness?
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs Motion for a New
Trial?
Issues one through three are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness.
Orton v Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
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Issues four and five are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
These issues were preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Motion in Limine filed May 21,
2004 R. 57-58; in the Motion and memoranda filed in support thereof. R.57-79,123-140; in
the Motion for a New Trial and memoranda filed in support thereof. R.253-265; in objections
to the testimony of Dr. France at trial, and in the arguments and testimony presented at trial.
Transcript volume II (R.321) pages 5-6; 7:4-12; 20-29; 121:4-10; 123:21-127:25; 135:14-16.
Hereafter, citations to the trial transcript shall be to the record by pages. The first day,
Volume I is R.320. The second day, Volume II is R.321. Citations to transcript pages shall
be set out as record number, page number, and line numbers, e.g., R.320 at 27:15-17.
With respect to the relevance argument contained in Point III, while the only objections
to the testimony of Dr. France at trial were on foundational grounds, as a matter of law his
opinions were not relevant. It was plain error for the judge to allow opinions which were not
relevant as a matter of law, and to which other objections had been made, to be presented to
the jury. The admission of such evidence is plain error and subject to review. State v Marvin
964 P.2d 313,318 (Utah 1998).
VI
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309
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2. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence
3. Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence
4. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Appellant, Ricardo Balderas (hereinafter "Balderas"), brought this action for
negligence. He claims that Appellee, Joseph Starks (hereinafter "Starks"), negligently drove
into the back of his car. The accident happened in a parking lot on January 1,2001. Balderas
was injured. He began treatment with Dr. Duy Tran on January 6, 2001, five days after the
accident.
Balderas had previously been involved in an accident in 1999. He treated with Dr.
Tran for injuries sustained in that accident until May of 2000. Dr. Tran estimated Balderas5
previous injuries resulted in a 15% impairment. He was released from care in May of 2000.
When Dr. Tran examined Balderas on January 6,2001, he diagnosed neck injuries. He
treated Balderas from January 6,2001 until April 3,2001, at which time he released Balderas,
having determined Balderas had reached the medical status he occupied prior to the January
1,2001 accident.
Starks claims that the 2001 accident was minor, and did not injure Balderas.
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Prior to trial, Starks hired Dr. France to render opinions on the question of whether or
not the forces generated in the accident were sufficient to cause the injuries Balderas claims.
R.321 at 11-12.
Balderas filed a Motion in Limine to preclude testimony by Dr. France on May 21,
2004. On August 16, 2004, the court heard argument on the Motion in Limine.
On September 13, 2004, the Court granted the motion in part by requiring a hearing
at trial on the issue of whether there was sufficient foundation to allow the experts to render
opinions at trial.
The case was tried to a jury for two days beginning September 21,2004. The hearing
on whether there was sufficient foundation to allow Dr. France to testify as to his conclusions
was held on September 22, 2004, the second day of trial. Dr. France testified to lay a
foundation for his opinions regarding impact speeds and forces generated in the collision.
Based upon his estimate of impact speed, and the resultant change in velocity generated at
collision, he opined that there was a low likelihood of anyone being injured in the collision.
While the court allowed Balderas to examine Dr. France on the issue of whether he was
qualified to render such opinions, the court severely limited the ability of Balderas to elicit
testimony to show the absence of a foundation for the proposed testimony. R.321 at 19-29.
The court cut short counsel's examination of Dr. France. R.321 at 29:11-16. The court
prohibited counsel from developing testimony to show that the methodology used by Dr.
France to reach his conclusions has never been tested for accuracy; that it is not peer

4

reviewed; and that it has never been shown to produce reliable conclusions as to actual impact
speeds or the forces generated in an accident1. Id.
Notwithstanding the refusal of the court to allow counsel to show the lack of scientific
acceptance of Dr. France's methodology, the court determined that there was sufficient
foundation to allow Dr. France to testify.
Dr. France testified, over objection of Balderas, that:
1. The impact speed of the Starks vehicle was in the range of 3-8 M.P.H. R.321 at
128:15-16.
2. The change in velocity generated in the collision was in the range of 1.6-4.3 M.P.H.
R.321 at 128:20-24.
3. That based upon his determination of the force generated in the accident, there was
a low probability that injury would occur. R.321 at 136.
At the close of testimony, the matter was submitted to the jury on special
interrogatories. In answering the interrogatories, the jury found that Starks was negligent, and
that his negligence was a proximate cause of injury to Balderas. The jury then found that

J

Dr. France so testified in another case. Had the court allowed counsel to continue with
his examination, counsel would have been able to establish the same evidence in this case. The
Court cut off counsel's attempt to show France's opinions had no scientific basis, and refused to
allow counsel to proceed to make such a showing R.231 at 29:11-16. Balderas has attached as
Exhibit 5 in the appendix, pertinent portions of deposition testimony of France to show the
testimony which could have been given had the court allowed counsel to finish his examination
of France.
5

special damages suffered by Balderas were $3,237.00 and general damages were $0.00.
R.321 at 136.
Balderas objected to the finding of no general damages. The Court then told the jury
that they must award some amount as general damages where special damages are awarded.
The jury deliberated briefly and returned with a general damages award of $1.00.
Balderas timely filed a Motion for a New Trial arguing to the trial court that it was
apparent the jury acted out of prejudice and passion and had ignored the evidence in the case
in awarding damages. Balderas argued there was no evidence in the record upon which the
jury could reasonably base a special damages award of less than the full amount of the
treatment costs testified to by Dr. Tran. Balderas further argued that the apparent failure of
the jury to award costs for travel to and from the doctor's office also evidenced that passion
and prejudice and/or a misunderstanding of the law influenced their verdict.
The trial court denied the Motion for a New Trial on November 15, 2004. Judgment
was entered in favor of Balderas on the jury verdict on December 7, 2004. Notice of Appeal
was filed on December 21, 2004.
B.

Statement of Facts

1. On January 1,2001, the parties were in a two car accident. R.320 at 69:16-19; 73:1318.
2. Starks' car rear ended Balderas' car in an icy parking lot. R.320 at 73:15-18.
3. Balderas was injured in the accident. R.320 at 53-58, 80-84; R.321 at 172-73.
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4. On his first visit to Dr. Tran, Balderas complained mainly of neck and back pain.
R.320 at 80-82.
5. Balderas was treated by Dr Duy Tran beginning January 6, 2001 through April 3,
2001. R.321 at 52-53; 71-72; 78-80.
6. Starks' medical expert, Dr. Jeffery Chung opined at trial that the injuries treated by
Dr. Tran from January 6, 2001 through April 3, 2001, were caused in the January 1, 2001
accident. R.320 at 172.
7. Balderas had a pre-existing impairment to his neck that was received in a 1999
accident. R.320 at 77-79.
8. Dr. Tran testified that the January 1,2001 accident exacerbated the neck impairment.
R.321 at 53.
9. Dr. Tran testified that he charged the sum of $4,699.00 to treat Balderas from
January 6, 2001 through April 3, 2001. R.321 at 72-77; 85-86; Exhibit 1.
10. Dr Tran testified that the sum of $4,699.00 was a fair and reasonable charge for the
medical services he rendered to Balderas. Id.
11. Dr. Tran testified that Balderas reached maximum medical improvement for his
2001 injuries on April 3, 2001. R.321 at 79-80.
12. Dr. Chung agreed that Balderas reached maximum medical improvement on April
3, 2001. R.320 at 172.
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13. No witness at trial testified that Balderas reached maximum medical improvement
at any time prior to April 3, 2001. R.320,321.
14. No witness testified at trial that any sum other than $4,699.00 was a fair and
reasonable cost for the medical treatments received by Balderas for his injuries in the January
15 2001 a c c i d e n t s .
15. No witness at trial testified that any of the treatments rendered by Dr. Tran were
unreasonable, or that any charge was unjustified. Id.
16. Starks hired Dr. France to testify at trial as an expert on the question of the
likelihood that a person would have been injured in the accident. R.321 at 11-12.
17. Dr. France opined at trial that the impact speed of the Starks vehicle was in the
range of 3-8 M.P.H. R.321 at 128:15-16.
18. Dr. France testified that based upon the range of impact speeds he had determined,
the change in velocity of the Balderas vehicle generated in the collision was in the range of
1.6-4.3 M.P.H. R.321 at 128:20-24.
19. Based upon his calculations of speed and change in velocity, Dr. France testified
that there was a low probability that anyone would be injured in the accident. R.321 at 136.
20. Prior to testifying, Dr. France did not examine either of the cars. R.321 at 124-25.
21. The information relied upon by Dr. France consisted of verbal representations of
Balderas and Starks regarding damage to their vehicles, a copy of a repair estimate on
Balderas' vehicle, and some photographs of the vehicles. R.321 at 118.
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22. Balderas testified there was damage underneath his car, which was not
photographed nor set out in the estimates of damage. R.320 at 117:8-25; 118:10-15.
23. Dr. France testified that the photographs and the repair estimate were used as a
basis for his opinion of the speed of the Starks5 vehicle at impact. R.321 at 118.
24. In reaching his conclusions, Dr. France also relied upon crash test data involving
cars that hit a barrier, a test performed under different circumstances than those existing at the
time of the subject accident. R.321 at 14-17.
25. The accident between the vehicles occurred on an icy surface, not involving a
barrier. R.321 at 122:15-123:15.
26. Following testimony, instruction, and argument, the case was submitted to the jury.
27. The jury found that Starks was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate
cause of Balderas5 injury. R.251-252.
28. The evidence showed special damages for the medical treatments cost $4,699.00,
and there was approximately $387.60 in travel costs. R.320 at 95: 5-25; 96:24-97:13; 189:1721; Exhibit 1.
29. The jury only awarded $3,237.00 in special damages for medical treatment of
Balderas5 injuries. R.251-252.
30. The jury originally awarded no general damages. R.321 at 222:24-25.
31. The trial court sent the jury out with a brief instruction that they must award some
amount for general damages. R.321 at 223:10-20.
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32. The jury returned with a general damages award of nominal damages in the sum
of $1.00. R.321 at 224:1-9.
33. Balderas filed a motion for a new trial on September 30, 2004. R.253-54.
34. The Motion was denied on November 15, 2004. R.279.
35. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict on December 6, 2004. R.295-98.
36. Notice of Appeal was filed December 21, 2004. R.299-300.
VIII
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGE ISSUES.
A. The General Damages Award Is Inconsistent with
the Special Damages Award and Is Against Utah Law
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant Balderas's Motion
asking for an additur, or in the alternative to refuse a new trial when Balderas was awarded
a substantial amount of special damages, but only $1.00 in general damages.
The standard of review on appeal for failure to award an additur or grant a new trial
is generally whether the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 803-04 (Utah 1991); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah
1998); Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122,126 (Utah 1997). However, if
"as a preliminary matter prior to the ultimate determination of the motion, the judge relies
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on legal principles that are erroneous, or facts that are wholly without record support, this
may also constitute grounds for reversal." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805, n.19.
Because the trial court used an erroneous understanding of when it is appropriate to
award nominal damages in a personal injury case, this first issue before the Court falls in
the ambit of a question of law, which should be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State
v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, 20 P.3d 888 (Utah 2001)(conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness, while decisions not to grant a new trial are reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard). Balderas submits, under the undisputed facts of this case, that he is
entitled to an additur or new trial as a matter of law because the jury cannot award more
than $3,000.00 in special damages, but only nominal general damages in this case.
There was no testimony from any witness that Balderas did not suffer pain or injury
as a result of the January 1, 2001 accident.
Starks presented no testimony to contradict or rebut Balderas5 claim that he
suffered injury and pain from the January 1, 2001 accident.
Notwithstanding, the jury awarded $3,237.00 in special damages, which was less
than the evidence, and initially awarded no general damages. R.321 at 222:24-25.
Balderas objected that the jury could not award $3,237.00 in special damages and
nothing in general damages. The trial court charged the jury to make a general damages
award, which they set at $1.00. The jury was polled and the verdict was rendered on a 6-2
vote.
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This Court has defined "nominal damages" as "a trivial sum such as one cent or one
dollar awarded to a Plaintiff whose legal right has been invaded but who has failed to
prove any compensatory damages." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998) [quoting
Gould v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 6 Utah 2d 187,189-90, 309 P.2d 802 (1957)].
Because the jury awarded the sum of $1.00 to Balderas, by definition the jury only
awarded "nominal damages." Id.
The facts of the jury's verdict are undisputed on appeal. As a preliminary matter to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award an additur or
in the alternative a new trial, the trial court's legal conclusion of whether this verdict is
inherently inconsistent and against Utah law must be examined. Crookston, 817 P.2d at
805, n.19. This question of law is "one on which an appellate court owes no deference to
a trial court's determination." State v. Pena, Supra at 936.
The jury found that the injuries Balderas suffered in the accident were caused by
the negligence of Starks. The jury then awarded Balderas $3,237.00 for special damages,
despite the fact Balderas incurred $4,699.00 for medical treatment costs and approximately
$387.60 in travel costs.
By awarding $3,237.00, the jury must necessarily have found that Starks was
responsible, and that Balderas had been injured. Consequently, the jury's award of $1.00
as nominal damages for pain and suffering is inherently inconsistent with the special
damages award. See, e.g., Kumorek v. Moyers, 561 N.E.2d 212 (111. App. 1990) (verdict
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irreconcilably inconsistent and showed jury disregarded proven element of damages where
jury awarded damages for extended medical treatment but awarded nothing for pain and
suffering).
If nominal damages are appropriately awarded only where a Plaintiff has failed to
prove any compensatory damages (Foote v. Clark, supra), then the jury's award of
$3,237.00 in special damages for injuries suffered in the accident is by definition
"irreconcilably inconsistent and showed the jury disregarded proven element of damages."
Kumoreh v. Moyers, supra.
The jury's verdict, as it stands, is contrary to Utah law on general and nominal
damages. Foote, Supra at 57. Under the definitions and structure of Utah's No Fault
Statute, it cannot be said Balderas failed to prove "any substantial damages." The jury
award of $3,237.00 cannot be considered to be insubstantial because the threshold
determination of the amount of damages which are sufficiently substantial to entitle a
plaintiff to an award of pain and suffering damages has been statutorily determined to be
not less than $3,000. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (Supp. 2001). See, Warren v.
Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah App. 1997) (holding Utah's No Fault Statute reasonably
prohibits general damage claims for "less serious personal injuries"). The Statute prevents
the bringing of suits for general damages in cases where "nominal damages" would have
historically been appropriate. It allows suits for general damages only when medical
expenses exceed $3,000.00, an amount which the legislature has determined shows
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substantial damage. The jury found that Balderas suffered medical damages in excess of
$3,000.00, by definition, therefore, his damages were not "nominal." He was entitled to
an award of more than nominal general damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22309(Supp. 2001).
The trial court thus erred in interpreting the law when it reached the legal
conclusion that an award of substantial special damages (in excess of the statutory
threshold of $3,000.00) does not require more than nominal general damages. Because the
trial court relied upon an erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court's ruling should be
reviewed for correctness and reversed. U.R.C.P. 59(6). Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
Supra at 805, n.19. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant Balderas'
motion for additur or in the alternative a new trial on damages.
B. There Is No Competent Evidence to Support the Jury's Reduction of Special
Damages testified to as reasonable by the medical experts.
The second issue on damages is whether the trial court erred by not granting an additur,
or in the alternative a new trial on damages, because the jury reduced Balderas' medical
damages without any evidentiary basis. The only testimony was that Balderas incurred
medical expenses in the sum of $4,699.00. There was no evidence in the record to contradict
the testimony of Dr. Duy Tran ("Tran") about the reasonable and necessary cost to treat
Balderas until April 3,2001, when he reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). Dr.
Jeffery Chung ("Chung"), Starks' independent medical examiner agreed that Balderas was
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injured in the accident and that he reached MMI on April 3, 2001. There was no testimony
that any of the treatment received by Balderas was unnecessary, or that the amounts charged
were unreasonable.
The standard of review for this issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., Supra at 803-04.
The record is devoid of any competent evidence to support a reduction of Balderas'
special damages to $3,237.00. The Utah Supreme Court requires competent evidence to
support a jury verdict. See, e.g., Time Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis, 657 P.2d 1284,
1287 (Utah 1982). Nowhere in the trial record is the sum of $3,237.00 mentioned. Neither
is there any credible evidence that Balderas' special damages were only $3,237.00.
When a trial court has denied a motion for a new trial, its decision can only be
sustained if there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d
730,732 (Utah 1982). Where the uncontested evidence from the medical testimony is that the
reasonable and necessary cost of treatment is $4,699.00, and then there is no evidentiary basis
to find a lesser amount, the jury is not allowed to award a lesser amount. Bennion v. LeGrand
Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985); Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d
1040, 1043 (Utah 1978).
There was insufficient evidence to justify a special damages verdict of $3,237.00. The
trial court abused its discretion when it denied Balderas' motion for an new trial. U.R.C.P.
59(a)(6).
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POINT II
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF PAUL FRANCE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE
UNDER RULE 702 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Starks offered the testimony of Dr. France as an expert on accident reconstruction.
Balderas asked the court to exclude the proposed testimony as lacking a proper foundation.
The court held a hearing on the qualifications of Dr. France, but stopped counsel's inquiry
prematurely. Baldaras was not given sufficient latitude to show that:
1. The methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact speed and
forces generated in the accident has never been tested to establish that the method produces
accurate results.
2. The methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact speed and
forces generated in the accident has never been tested to establish a margin of error for the
determinations made by this method.
3. The accuracy of the methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on
impact speed and forces generated in the accident has never been peer reviewed.
4. The methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact speed and
forces generated in the accident merely allow Dr. France to give an "educated guess."
After stopping Counsel's examination prematurely, the Court ruled that Dr. France
could testify about the impact speed and the forces generated in the accident, as well as the
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statistical likelihood of an injury in such an accident. The court made this ruling without
requiring Starks to make any showing that the proposed testimony was accurate, reliable, or
relevant. R.321 at 20-29.
Pursuant to Rule 702, U. R. E., a trial judge has a critical "gatekeeping" responsibility,
when expert opinions are proffered, to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah
1996). See Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Phillips v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1980)(Inherent reliability rather than general acceptance is the
touchstone of admissibility); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown,
948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997); Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002). The trial court
has the responsibility to exclude so called "junk science," or "science" which has no accepted
scientific basis. Id.
Legitimate science consists of methodologies which have been shown by scientific
testing to produce consistent and reliable results. Accepted scientific methodologies are
subjected to testing to show that the methodology produces consistent and reliable results.
Margins of error in the testing are measured and published. The testing is peer reviewed for
accuracy and reliability. The methodology is reviewed to see if it consistently produces the
same results and to see if the results can be consistently replicated.
In its gatekeeper role, the trial court must ensure that the so-called "scientific
evidence" proffered by the defense is inherently reliable; that any scientific principles and
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techniques used by the expert, and found by the court to be reliable, have been properly
applied to specific facts at issue in the case, and not to mere speculations or guesses; and that
the "experts" are sufficiently qualified to correctly apply the techniques and principles.
These steps must properly be taken to assure that in fact the proffered "scientific
evidence" is more probative than prejudicial. See Rimmasch, supra; Crosby, supra; Brown,
supra.
In the subject trial, the inherent reliability of France's testimony was absent. The court
allowed Dr. France to give his opinion as to the impact speed, and then based on this estimate
to opine about the forces generated in the collision. The basis of his testimony was:
1. An examination of photographs of the damaged vehicles;
2. Verbal reports of damage to the vehicles;
3. Repair estimates; and
4. A speed estimate by starks.
During his testimony, Dr. France identified no scientifically accepted principles or
techniques which would allow an expert to correctly determine impact speed by merely
considering verbal damage information, examining a repair estimate and photos of the
bumpers of the two cars, and considering barrier crash test data. If the trial court had allowed
Balderas to complete his examination of Dr. France during the hearing on foundation, counsel
would have established by Dr. France's own testimony that the methodology he used has
never been tested for accuracy, nor shown to give accurate results which would allow a
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reliable speed estimate to be given. See f.n.l, supra; f.n. 4, infra. In fact, Dr. France would
have been forced to admit he was only giving, at best, an educated guess as to the impact
speed. Id. That would be insufficient and objectionable.
The issues raised in this appeal have never been determined in Utah. However, this
exact issue was presented to the Virginia Supreme Court in Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 Va.
151, 475 S.E. 2d 261 (1996). In Tittsworth, the trial court had allowed an expert to give
testimony as to estimated impact speed based upon an examination of photographs and repair
estimates without actually examining the damage to the vehicles. On appeal, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that such evidence lacked a sufficient foundation and was speculative.
It then reversed the trial court.
In this case, the methodology used by Dr. France to determine impact speed and the
resultant change in velocity generated by the impact is identical to the method used by the
expert in Tittsworth, and it is equally unreliable.
The so-called "scientific" examination performed by Dr. France in this case is not
based upon any methodology which has ever been scientifically accepted for the purpose of
establishing impact speed with any degree of accuracy. It merely allows a guess. See f.n. 5,
infra.
In Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987), our Court held that without evidence
of the reliability of testing, the results of such tests are inadmissable. Id. at 1346-47. The
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Kofford Court held that if the techniques used in the testing are not shown to be accepted as
reliable, the Court must find the test to be unreliable. Id. at 1347.
Had the trial court allowed Balderas to complete his examination of Dr. France, it
would have been established that Dr. France's methodology was inherently unreliable. The
Tittsworth Court reached this conclusion under almost identical circumstances.

The

Tittsworth Court held opinions reached with the same methodology used by Dr. France were
not admissible, and that a trial court had erred by allowing such opinions to be expressed to
a jury.
Due to the speculation involved in Dr. France's determination of impact speed, his
testimony was inherently unreliable. Id. Starks has failed to make available to Dr. France any
type of evidence which would allow him to determine impact speed by any recognized
scientific method. Instead, Dr. France has simply taken pre-conceived conclusions which
support Starks' theory of the case, and has attempted to support those conclusions with
selected items of evidence which are, of themselves, insufficient to provide any recognized
scientific basis for his opinions. These types of speculative opinions are simply not
admissible. Rirnmasch, supra; Tittsworth, supra; Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
R.R.t 2001 Utah 77, 31 P.3d 557 (2001). See State vPendergrass, 803 P.2d 261 (Utah app.
1990)(psychiatrists testimony excluded because it relied upon too many unknown facts);
Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989)(expert opinion excluded
because based, in part, on speculation as to facts).
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No testimony was ever given that would support the proposition that an impact speed
can be accurately determined based upon the methodology used by Dr. France in this case.
Such unfounded and inherently unreliable opinions do not meet the requirements for
admission of scientific testimony set out in Rirnrnasch, and are inadmissable under Rule 702.
Rirnmasch, supra; Brewer, supra; Tittsworth, supra.
POINT III
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF PAUL FRANCE WAS NOT RELEVANT AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT,
Even if Starks could establish a proper foundation for the conclusions and opinions of
Dr. France, his expert opinions were not relevant. It was prejudicial error for the jury to hear
them.
Evidence with the slightest probative value is relevant. However, when there is no
probative value to a fact at issue, offered evidence is irrelevant, immaterial, and should be
excluded. State v. Smedley, 61 P.3d 1005 (Utah App. 2003).
The probative value of evidence is determined on the basis of need, and its ability to
make the existence of a consequential fact more or less probable. Ostler v. Albina Transfer
Co., Inc., supra; State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (1980). When the evidence goes to an issue
which has already been decided, it must be excluded as irrelevant. Ostler, supra at 449.
In the present case, the opinion of Dr. France was that if we assume Balderas was
healthy at the time of the accident, it was not probable that he would be injured in the
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accident. R.321 at 139. Whether or not Balderas could have been injured was not an issue.
It was previously established by all the medical testimony that Balderas was injured in the
subject accident.
Dr. France specifically testified that he was not a doctor and was not opining on the
issue of whether or not there was an actual injury. He testified he would defer to the medical
providers on the issue of whether, in fact, Balderas had been injured in the accident. R.321
at 136:6-9; 142:10-15; 148:7-17; 154:2-5.
Prior to Dr. France being called to testify, both of the treating physicians, Dr. Tran and
Dr. Chung, testified that Balderas was injured in the accident. R.320 at 172; R.321 at 53, 5758.
Dr. France's testimony went to the sole issue of the probability of a person being
injured by the forces he opined were generated in the accident. He specifically stated he was
not a medical doctor, and he would defer to the doctors on the issue of whether or not
Balderas had actually been injured in the accident. R.321 at 136:6-9; 142:10-15; 148:7-17;
154:2-5. He said he only spoke to probabilities and potentials, and the doctors must decide
if there was an actual injury. R.321 at 148:7-17. Therefore, once the doctors unanimously
determine there was an injury, Dr. France's testimony on the probabilities and potential for
injury in the accident became meaningless. Allowing him to opine as to the potential of an
injury was prejudicial error. It could only serve to confuse the jury.
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Dr. France testified he was not opining on the issue of actual injury, but only on the
question of whether or not an injury was probable. Such testimony cannot make the fact of
injury more or less probable in light of unanimous opinions by the doctors that Balderas was
injured in the collision. Therefore, the testimony of Dr. France was irrelevant and immaterial.
Its admission was in error and likely influenced the jury in reaching its judgment.
IX
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGE ISSUES.
Introduction
At trial, the jury found the negligence of Starks to be a proximate cause of injury to
Balderas. They then awarded special damages of $3,237.00, and general damages in the
nominal amount of $1.00. Balderas filed a motion for a new trial claiming the jury acted
improperly in making such an award. The trial court denied the Motion. Balderas claims it
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse either an additur for general damages,
or in the alternative, a new trial. As set forth below, the verdict was inconsistent, and the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the Motion.
A. THE GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE SPECIAL DAMAGES AWARD AND IS AGAINST UTAH LAW.
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The standard of review on appeal for failure to award an additur or grant a new trial
is generally whether the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch., supra at 803-04; Child v. Gonda, supra at 429; Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc.,
supra. However, if "as a preliminary matter prior to the ultimate determination of the motion,
the judge relies on legal principles which are erroneous or facts which are wholly without
record support, this may also constitute grounds for reversal." Crookston, supra at 805, n. 19.
Balderas submits this first issue before the Court falls in the ambit of a question of law,
which should be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Evans, supra. (Conclusions of
law are reviewed for correctness, while decisions not to grant a new trial are reviewed under
the abuse of discretion standard). Balderas submits, under the undisputed facts of this case,
that he is entitled to an additur or new trial as a matter of law.
Nevertheless, Balderas will first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding of $ 1.00 for general damages2. At trial, Balderas testified that he had been
in a prior accident in 1999 and had received medical treatment from Dr. Tran for the injuries
he received. R.320 at 77:15-23.
Balderas testified that after he was released by Dr. Tran in May of 2000, he tried to be
careful about his neck. He had no other injury or trauma to his neck until the subject accident
2

Balderas' position is that given the $3,237.00 special damages award, as a matter of law
the jury must have found a substantial injury to Balderas in the January 1, 2001 accident. In
marshaling the evidence, Balderas has included the testimony regarding the effect of the injuries
on Balderas. The record is devoid of any evidence that Balderas suffered no damage or only
nominal damage. No witness testified contrary to the testimony of Balderas and the two doctors
who all testified Balderas was injured and required substantial medical treatment.
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on January 1, 2001. R.320 at 79:17-24. His neck was doing good just prior to the accident.
R.320 at 79:25-80:4.
After the accident on January 1,2001, Balderas felt something in his neck. He began
to develop pain, so he went back to Dr. Tran. R.320 at 80:5-81:4. Dr. Tran told him he had
re-injured his neck and began treatment. R.320 at 81:5- 82:1. Balderas understood that the
purpose of Dr. Tran's treatment was to return him to pre-injury status. R.320 at 84:3-24.
Balderas testified that the chiropractic treatments from Dr. Tran caused his condition to
improve. R.320 at 85:7-86:4. Balderas testified that Dr. Tran's treatments returned him to his
pre-injury status. R.320 at 84:11-24. Balderas testified that he was released by Dr. Tran in
early April 2001. R.320 at 85:24-86:4.
Balderas described his pain following the accident as "numbness, needles, like
popping pain in the arm." He said his arm ached and kept going to sleep. R.320 at 86:5-13.
During his early visits, Dr. Tran asked Balderas to rate his pain on the 1-10 scale. Balderas
testified the pain was severe and estimated his pain to be 8. R.320 at 86:14-24; 87:3-5. By the
end of January, the pain improved to 3-4 on the scale. R.320 at 86:25-87:2. Balderas testified
that working made his pain worse, but that he lived with it. R.320 at 87:16-25. He testified
that he went to work in pain because his wife was sick. R.320 at 88:1-2. He testified that his
hobby was restoring old cars, but that he could not work on cars because of the injury. R.320
at 88:3-89:5.
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Balderas testified that Dr. Iran's treatment helped him recover and was necessary to
treat his injuries from the January 1,2001 accident. R.320 at 94:11 -18. He testified that he had
to travel 25-30 miles round trip to Dr. Tran's office for each treatment. R.320 at 95:3-16,2325.
Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence without objection. It was Dr. Tran's medical
records and the billings for his treatments in the amount of $4,699.00. The exhibit also shows
the number of visits Balderas made to Dr. Tran's office. Exhibit 1; R.320 ait 96:24 - 97:13.
On cross-examination, Balderas admitted that he had seen his family doctor, Dr.
Moore, on January 15, 2001about his cholesterol level. R.320 at 113:18-115:9. He did not
talk to Dr. Moore about this accident. R.320 at 115:10-116:4.
No questions were asked on cross examination about Balderas reaching MMI prior to
April 3, 2001. No testimony was given that suggested Balderas had reached his pre-injury
status prior to his release by Dr. Tran on April 3,2001. No evidence was introduced that his
treatments were unnecessary, or that he had not suffered the pain and discomfort he described.
Dr. Chung testified briefly. His testimony is contained in R.320 at pages 171 -174. In
his testimony, Dr. Chung said he was a board certified specialist in physical medicine and
rehabilitation. R.320 at 171:14-15. Dr. Chung was hired by Starks to perform an independent
medical examination of Balderas. R.320 at 171:16-19. Dr. Chung performed his examination
on October 21, 2003. R.320 at 171:20-23. Dr. Chung was hired to examine Balderas and to
testify at trial about the injuries he received in the accident of January 1, 2001. R.320 at
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172:2-7. Dr. Chung concluded that Balderas was injured in the January 1,2001 accident, and
that the injury exacerbated a pre-existing injury, and that Balderas reached MMI on April 3,
2001, the last day he was treated by Dr. Tran. R.320 at 172:8-18.
On cross-examination, Dr. Chung said Balderas refused to discuss the mechanism of
injury on advice of counsel. R.320 at 173:10-22. However, on re-direct examination, Dr.
Chung admitted that Balderas' refusal to discuss the mechanism of injury did not prevent the
examination or affect his ability to reach his conclusions. R.320 at 174:5-12.
Dr. Tran testified he is a licensed chiropractor. R.321 at 33:17-25. Dr. Tran specializes
in treating patients involved in auto accidents R.321 at 36:14-17. He defines successful
treatment as getting a patient back to pre-accident status. R.321 at 47:11-12. He treated
Balderas for his 1999 accident beginning January 29, 2000. R.321 at 48:25-49:5. Balderas
was treated for a neck injury, pain, and numbness in his hands. R.321 at 49:2-50:9. Balderas
was treated until he reached MMI and was then given an impairment rating of fifteen percent
(15%). R.321 at 50:10-51:3. When Dr. Tran released Balderas from treatment for his 1999
injury, he told him he would have to avoid certain activities, that he would be subject to reinjuring his neck, that he could expect to still suffer some pain, and that if needed he should
return for treatment. R.321 at 51:4-52:17. Dr. Tran examined Balderas in May 2000 at the
time of his release from care. R.321 at 70:2-5. At that time Balderas had a 15% impairment,
which makes him weaker than the average person. Such impairment also increased his
likelihood of injury in a subsequent accident. R.321 at 70:2-14.
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Following his release in May of 2000, Dr. Tran did not see Balderas again until January
6, 2001. At that time Balderas came to see Dr. Tran about the January 1, 2001 accident.
R.321 at 52:18-53:3. Dr. Tran examined Balderas on January 6,2001 and determined that his
condition was worse than when he had been released in May, 2000. R.321 at 53:4-15.
Balderas complained of pain in his neck and back. R.321 at 56:22-57:2. Dr. Tran determined
that Balderas was injured. R.321 at 57:3-5. He objectively determined Balderas was suffering
moderate to severe pain. R.321 at 57:6-58:10. Dr. Tran testified the injury to Balderas was
what he would expect from rear-end accident. R.321 at 58:20-24; 71:7-23.
Dr. Tran testified that he provided care and treatment to Balderas for the injury
received in the January 1, 2001 accident. R.321 at 71:19-72:1. The treatment given and cost
thereof is set forth in the medical records received as Exhibit 1. R.321 at 72:2-77:21; 85:2586:6. The treatment provided by Dr. Tran was given in compliance with protocols for
treatment accepted by The Utah Chiropractic Association. R.321 at 75:6-11. Under the care
of Dr. Tran, Balderas reached MMI more quickly than Dr. Tran had expected. R.321 at 78:710. During Balderas' treatment, Dr. Tran noted severe pain during January. R.321 at 78:1421. Dr. Tran testified that the progression of healing during treatment is never steady. There
are ups and downs in how the patient feels until they complete treatment. R.321 at 78:2279:9. Dr. Tran treated Balderas until April 3, 2001, when he reached his pre-injury status.
Dr. Tran released Balderas from his care at that time. R.321 at 79:10-80:3. Dr. Tran testified
that the treatment given by him resolved Balderas5 injuries from the accident; it was necessary
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to treat injuries received in the January 1, 2001 accident; and that his charges for such care
were fair and reasonable. R.321 at 86:7-87:13.
Dr. Tran admitted that Balderas had received some care for pain relief between May
2000 and January 2001. R.321 at 88:6-18. Such care was necessitated by the 15%
impairment. R.321 at 88:22-89:2. Dr. Tran testified he was able to differentiate between
problems Balderas had before and after the January 1, 2001 accident. R.321 at 89:3-8. He
stated that following the January 1, 2001 accident, Balderas had a new and acute problem.
R.321 at 89:12-23.
On cross-examination, Dr. Tran testified that during his treatment of Balderas, his
reported intensity of pain went from 8 to 2. The pain level was at 4 when Balderas was
released on April 3, 2001. R.321 at 110:3-12. Balderas' pain improved steadily during
treatment. R.321 at 110:13-16. Dr. Tran admitted that Balderas5 pre-existing injury factored
into the pain Balderas suffered while being treated for the January 1, 2001 injury. R.321 at
110:17-23.
There was no testimony from any witness that Balderas did not suffer pain or injury
as a result of the January 1, 2001 accident.
Starks presented no testimony to contradict or rebut Balderas' claim that he suffered
injury and pain from the January 1, 2001 accident, or that the reasonable and necessary cost
of treatment for Balderas' injuries was any amount other than $4,699.00.
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Notwithstanding the above, jury awarded only $3,237.00 in special damages. The
jury's original general damage award was $0.00. R.321 at 222:24-25.
When Balderas objected that the jury could not award $3,237.00 in special damages
and nothing in general damages, the trial court charged the jury to make a general damages
award with the following instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen, the attorneys have pointed correctly that there is a small
error in this matter. Once the jury has reached a verdict and has decided that it has
found special and general damages, you must award something for general
damages. Any amount is sufficient to satisfy what the law requires. So you have to
reach some decision on the second portion. R.321 at 223:10-17.
This was the only additional instruction given to the jury on damages. No instruction
on nominal damages was given.
The jury retired briefly and returned with a verdict for special damages of $3,237.00
and general damages in the nominal amount of $1.00. The jury was polled and the verdict
was shown to have been rendered on a 6-2 vote.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "nominal damages" as "a trivial sum such as one
cent or one dollar awarded to a Plaintiff whose legal right has been invaded but who has failed
to prove any compensatory damages." Foote v. Clark, supra at 57 (quoting Gould v. Mountain
States Tel & Tel Co., 6 Utah 2d 187,189-90, 309 P.2d 802 (1957)) (emphasis added).
Because the jury awarded only $1.00 to Balderas, by definition it awarded only "nominal
damages." Id.
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The facts of the jury's verdict are undisputed on appeal. As a preliminary matter to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award an additur or in
the alternative a new trial, the trial court's legal conclusion of whether this verdict is
inherently inconsistent and against Utah law must be examined. Crooks ton, supra at 805,
n.19. This question of law is "one on which an appellate court owes no deference to a trial
court's determination." State v. Pena, supra at 936.
Question 2 on the Special Verdict Form asked the question "Was Starks' negligence
a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Balderas?" The jury answered this question
"yes." R.321 at 222:22-23. Thus, the jury found that the injuries Balderas suffered in the
accident were caused by the negligence of Starks. The jury then awarded Balderas $3,237.00.
R.320 at 222:24. The only evidence on special damages was that the medical treatments cost
$4,699.00, and there was approximately $387.60 in travel costs. R.320 at 95: 5-25; 96:2497:13; 189:17-21; Exhibit 1.
By awarding $3,237.00 to Balderas based on his claim for medical treatment and travel
costs, the jury must have necessarily found that Balderas had suffered sufficiently serious pain
and injury to warrant medical treatment for the injuries related to the accident. Consequently,
the jury's later award of $1.00 as nominal damages for pain and suffering is inherently
inconsistent with their special damages award. See, e.g., Kumorek v. Moyers, supra (verdict
irreconcilably inconsistent and showed jury disregarded proven element of damages where
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jury awarded damages for extended medical treatment but awarded nothing for pain and
suffering).
If nominal damages are appropriate only when a plaintiff fails to prove any damages
(Foote v. Clark, supra), then the jury's award of $3,237.00 was by definition "irreconcilably
inconsistent and showed the jury disregarded proven element of damages." Kumorek v.
Moyers, supra.
The jury's verdict was contrary to Utah law on general and nominal damages. Since
the jury found Balderas suffered sufficient pain to warrant an award of $3,237.00 for medical
treatment, it cannot be said Balderas failed to prove "any compensatory damages." Foote,
supra at 57.
Neither can it be said Balderas failed to prove "any substantial damages." The
$3,237.00 damage award is sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to a significant award for pain and
suffering. The amount of special damages necessary to allow a plaintiff to recover damages
for pain and suffering has been statutorily determined. Utah's no-fault threshold statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309, has statutorily prohibited a general damage award in smaller tort
claims arising out of automobile accidents-situations where nominal damages would normally
be justified for plaintiffs who have showed a legal right has been invaded, but have failed to
prove compensatory damages. See, Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309 (l)(a); Warren v. Melville,
supra at 563 (holding Utah's no-fault statutes reasonably prohibit general damage claims for
"less serious personal injuries"). By exceeding the $3,000.00 statutory threshold, Balderas
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suffered substantial special damages that entitle him to more than nominal general damages.
See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l)(a)(v) (Supp. 2001). As a matter of law, nominal general
damages of $1.00 are not appropriate in this case.
This issue appears to be one of first impression in Utah. However, in Langton v.
International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
denial of a new trial where the jury awarded $868.25 in special damages but no general
damages, because the plaintiff failed to object to the defective verdict of zero (as opposed to
nominal) damages. Id. at 1213.
In dictum, the Langton Court said: "[I]t must be conceded that if plaintiff were entitled
to an award of special damages, he was entitled to be compensated, under the evidence, for
pain and suffering . . . ." Id. at 1214. Indeed, such is the rule in many other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Kapley v. Kim, 843 P.2d 133 (Colo. App. 1992) (award of $0.00 in non-economic
damages could not stand in the face of a special damage award of $3,000.00 incurred for
treatment and alleviation of pain); Shewry v. Heuer, 121 N.W. 2d 529 (Iowa 1963) (abuse of
discretion to not grant a new trial where jury awarded costs of medical expenses for treatment
of pain and suffering yet nothing for general damages).
The trial court erred by concluding that an award of substantial special damages in
excess of the statutory threshold of $3,000.00 does not require a significant general damages
award. It is obvious the jury acted from passion or prejudice.
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Because the trial court relied upon an erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court's
ruling should be reversed. U.R.C.P. 59(6). Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., supra at 805, n.19.
The above factors show the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant Balderas'
motion for additur or in the alternative a new trial on damages.
B. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
REDUCTION OF SPECIAL DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO AS REASONABLE BY
THE MEDICAL EXPERTS.
The second issue on damages is whether the trial court erred by not granting an additur,
or in the alternative a new trial on damages, because the jury reduced special damages without
any credible evidence to support a reduction. Balderas incurred medical expenses in the sum
of $4,699.00. Dr. Tran testified that the reasonable and necessary cost of medical treatment
was $4,699.00. Balderas reached MMI on April 3,2001. Dr. Chung was Starks' independent
medical examiner. He agreed that Balderas was injured in the accident and that he reached
MMI on April 3, 2001.
The standard of review for this issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., supra at 803-04.
Again, Balderas recognizes his duty to "first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding" on this issue 3 .

3

The evidence marshaled for Point I (A) above at pages 25-32 is the evidence on damages
in the case. The same evidence applies to the claims made in Point 1(B).
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There was no credible evidence to support the jury's reduction of Balderas' special
damages to $3,237.00. The Utah Supreme Court has held it takes competent evidence to
support a jury verdict. See, e.g., Time Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis, supra at 1287.
Nowhere in the trial record is the sum of $3,237.00 mentioned. Moreover, there was no
evidence that suggested Balderas' special damages were only $3,237.00.
The only evidence on the issue of the necessity and reasonableness of the medical
treatment provided to Balderas was given by the two medical providers. Dr. Tran said the cost
of his treatment was $4,699.00 and that such cost was a fair and reasonable charge for the
necessary treatment following the January 1,2001 accident. R.321 at 86:7-87:13. Dr. Chung
did not disagree. There was no testimony from any other witness at trial on the issue of the
cost of Balderas' treatment or the necessity thereof. A review of the testimony of the two
doctors leads to the inescapable conclusion that there is no competent evidence in the record
to support the jury's verdict that special damages were $3,237.00. That figure is nowhere
mentioned in the evidence.
There was no testimony that the mileage amount claimed by Balderas for travel to and
from his doctor appointments was not incurred; no evidence that the claimed reimbursement
amount was unreasonable; and no evidence that some other amount was more appropriate.
The only way the jury could have reached a special damages verdict of $3,237.00 was
to ignore the evidence presented to them and act out of passion and prejudice. The award was
not based on any competent evidence presented at trial.
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The Utah Supreme Court requires competent evidence to support a jury verdict. See,
e.g., Time Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis, supra. When a trial court denies a motion
for a new trial, its decision can only be sustained if there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's
decision. Nelson v. Trujillo, supra. Therefore, when the undisputed evidence from the doctors
shows that the cost of reasonable and necessary medical treatment was $4,699.00, absent
testimony to support a lesser amount there is no evidentiary basis to reduce that amount. The
jury is not allowed to disregard the undisputed evidence. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson
Construction Co., supra at 1084; Batty v. Mitchell, supra at 1043. Without an evidentiary
basis, the jury cannot award an amount that is less than the amount which the doctors testified
was reasonable and necessary to treat the injuries received in the accident. Nelson v. Trujillo,
supra; Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., supra; Batty v. Mitchell, supra. Thus,
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Balderas' motion for a new trial.
POINT II
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF PAUL FRANCE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE
UNDER RULE 702 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
On May 21, 2004, Balderas filed a Motion in Limine asking the Court to exclude
the proposed expert testimony of Dr. France. R.57-8. The Motion was briefed by the
parties. R.59-140. On September 13, 2004, the Court heard oral argument. R.141.
The court ruled that there would be a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to
determine if the court should properly allow Dr. France to testify to his opinions. R.141.
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The hearing on the admissibility of the opinions of Dr. France was held on
^:- member 22, 2004, the morning of the second day ol c..... .:,-.. aiuii severe! < limited
Balderas' efforts to show that 1 he methodolc >g> i isedb) Dr France has never been
•.:\v-^ '.- ..- ••..•i;^ir--'-:nl!y accurate; that the method has never been peer reviewed; and ih,::
there have never been any scientific studies that support the methodology he used, i > i>
methodology simply fails to produce accurate results within any u.gi e.
margin ol cnoi

Baldei : .

••:

low that, at Ixvst. l)i Frninr'r- was testify ingto an

"educated guess, ,|n R ^ i ai 21-29; 123-127. See f.n. I, supra.
The Court precluded counsel from offering evidence to establish the following facts:
] The mcthodojug} u^eu p* i.
;;

•...;-gcnurau\;

i;

r ranee to reach i,j--^pink-ii:- .•:.

, , ;!."••

!

>ri».., • = st.-, *.*.-^.u

;;«...->.-ced
a that the

rneth^" produces accurate results.
2 . 1 ue inethodoiugv used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact speed
and forces generated in the accident lia^ n>c\ e; Deen le^iec \c e^iar.. :. .* .^'gm
- ••• . ••:.

oi error lor the d e l e r m i n j i h o n s m a d e b \ ' this m e t h o d .

4

••

". ' • • '•' ",

•

Dr. France has so testified in a deposition m another case, and had the coui t allowed
counsel to continue with his examination, counsel would have been able to establish the same
evidence in this case. Balderas has attached the pertinent portions of such deposition testimony
as Exhibit 5 in the appendix for illustrative purposes to show" the court that Dr. France has in fact
so testified. The testimony of Dr, France that when he is using the methodology he used in this
case, he is merely making an "educated guess," is set forth at pages 50-51, 61 of the deposition
contained in Addendum Exhibit 5.
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3. The accuracy of the methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions
on impact speed and forces generated in the accident has never been peer
reviewed.
4. The methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact speed
and forces generated in the accident merely allow Dr. France to give an
"educated guess." Id. See, f.n.l and 4, supra.
The court terminated counsel's inquiry prematurely (R.321 at 29), and ruled that Dr.
France could give his opinion of the impact speed and the forces generated in the accident,
as well as the statistical probability of an injury in such a accident. The court made this ruling
without requiring Starks to make any showing that the proposed testimony was accurate,
reliable, or relevant.
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Pursuant to Rule 702, U.R.E., a trial judge has a critical "gatekeeping" responsibility
when expert opinions are proffered. He must "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." State v. Crosby, supra at 641. See,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra; State v. Rimmasch, supra; State v.
Brown, supra. The trial court has the responsibility to exclude so called "junk science," or
science which has no accepted scientific basis. Id.
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Legitimate science consists of methodologies which have been shown by scientific
testing to produce consistent and reliable results. Accepted scientific methodologies have
been tested tu ensue the;, piodmL i.uiisiUcnt and reluMe iiSdilK

Margin* ut TFOI HI (he

testing are measi ired and published. The testing is peer reviewed for accuracy and reliability.
The methodology is reviewed to see if it consistently produces the same results and to see if
the results are consistently replicated.
. In its gatekeepi-

-*

?

<c

e\ idence" proffered b> the defense is inherently reliable. Further, that an)1 scientific
principles and techniques used by the expert, once determined by the court to be reliable, have
been properly applied to the specific facts at issue in the case and not to mere specu.kti.oiis or
guesses. ;> ,;..v.
applb - I:h

. . . .

"-v

K S ^K

. s: ;•*...

qualified to correctly

• • - • - h .•*•• - S • RimmascL <w>'>\r Crosby, supra; Brown, supra.

These step- must properl\ be taken \o assui- li. : i; ; .e* me proffered "scientific
evidence" is more probative than prejudicial Id.
This respunsibilii) m uhiin" IIM IIIIIOUMIIMI MI iiiiiieliable scienni'n I'HCKMUV is
^:v.,;.. t> i rc -iv - ;

IS a

critical one because, as the Court observed in Crosby:

[EJvidence not shown to be reliable cannot, a* a matter of law. "assist
the trier of fact to understand the e\ idence or to determine a rac
issue" and, therefore is inadmissablc. 02~ I\2d a; f»-*;>

against:
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[T]he tendency of the finder of fact to abandon its responsibility to
decide the critical issues and simply adopt the judgment of the expert
despite an inability to accurately appraise the validity of the
underlying science.
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396.
In Brewer v Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 2001 Utah 77, 31 P.3d 557 (2001),
the Court explained:
Under Rimmasch, a court must conduct a three-part analysis to determine the
admissibility of scientific evidence. First, Rimmasch requires a threshold
showing that the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's
testimony are "inherently reliable." If the techniques and principles at issue
have been "generally] accepted]. . . in the relevant scientific community,"
the court may take judicial notice of their inherent reliability. If judicial
notice is not appropriate, however, "the court must determine whether the
party seeking to have the evidence admitted has sufficiently demonstrated
the inherent reliability of the underlying principles and techniques. This
foundational assessment must explore such questions as the correctness of
the scientific principles underlying the testimony, the accuracy and reliability
of the techniques utilized in applying the principles to the subject matter
before the court and in reaching the conclusion expressed in the opinion, and
the qualifications of those actually gathering the data and analyzing it.
If the proponent of the scientific evidence in question satisfies the threshold
requirement of inherent reliability-either by judicial notice or through a
foundational showing-the trial court must then consider Rimmasch's second
and third requirements. "Rimmasch's second requirement is a 'determination
that. . .the scientific principles or techniques have been properly applied to
the facts of the particular case by qualified persons and that the testimony is
founded on that work.'" Finally, Rimmasch's third requirement is a
determination of whether the evidence will be more probative than
prejudicial as mandated by Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Brewer, Supra at
563-64 (citations omitted).
By failing to ensure that the methodology and technique being used by Dr. France to
reach his conclusions were reliable, the court failed its gatekeeping responsibility.
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Balderas argued thai Dr. France's lesiiniony was not inherently reliable because:
.-.-' 1. The techniques used by Di. 1'ranee to reae

..:.; ^ r.vK.si.... ; ,* .

,.cn

scienl11icalI> tested in establish th.il i person » an eoihistnitb inviiiiilch and reliably reach
the conch isions he claims to be able to reach from looking at photographs and estimates of
the damage to the vehicles;
2. Themethodol OGTV U S C u
scien , : • . : .
-y.r. '.:*• . - / T O ' -

•

.;. i'iancetoreachhiscok, ,u^..)iii :.•.:. .;...,... •

.e

- • 'oduces acci irate results w ithin ail)Treasonable

•.-..•
ami

3. Dr. France had. insu fficient information to allow him to reach accurate conclusions
a? to the impact speed based upon anv met r.-J. :^j

v. J ; ,- recognizee ::, . . * * ;:;c

• - ?!v< reasons, Dr. France's opinion^ J v not mee; ihc siandards adopted Uj our
Supreme Court for admission of evidence under Rule 702. See, Rimmasch, supra; Crosby,
supra; Brown, supra. (. /.. ilttsworth, supra.

and then to use that opinion to support his opinion about the forces generated in the collision.
\\\ -f which was based only on:
1. \r\ examination w! photographs ui ;,-.. damaged vehicles;
2 R epair estimates; ai id .'

•'

;

. ^. '

3. A speed estimate by Starks.
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During his testimony, Dr. France identified no scientifically accepted principles or
techniques which would allow an expert to correctly determine impact speed by merely
examining a repair estimate and photos of the bumpers of the two cars. Had the trial court
allowed Balderas to complete his examination of Dr. France's foundation for his testimony,
it would have been clear that the methodology he used has never been tested for accuracy, nor
shown to give accurate results that would allow a reliable speed estimate to be given. In fact,
Dr. France would have been forced to admit he was only giving, at best, an educated guess
as to the impact speed. See, f.n. 4, supra.
The issues raised in this appeal have never been determined in Utah. However, this
exact issue was presented to the Virginia Supreme Court in Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 Va.
IQjWji^^

In Tittsworth, the trial court allowed an expert to estimate

impact speed based upon an examination ofphotographs and repair estimates without actually
examining the damage to the vehicles. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that such
evidence lacked a sufficient foundation and was speculative. The trial court was reversed.
In this case, the methodology used by Dr. France to determine impact speed and the
resultant change in velocity generated by the impact is identical to the method used by the
expert in Tittsworth. It was not based upon any methodology which is scientifically accepted
for establishing an impact speed with any degree of accuracy. It merely results in a guess.
Like Tittsworth, the Utah Supreme Court held that without evidence of the reliability
of testing, the results of such tests are inadmissable. Kofford v. Flora, supra at 1346-47. The
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Kofford Court held that if the techniques used in the testing are not shown to be accepted as
reliable, the court must find the test to be unrelidbu
• • -'

,,

•~

I he trial coi n it e i i ed in pi en lati irely tei mim it ing Balderas' inquiry

In a ddition, the

coy i ( failed to assure Ihc scientific reliability of Dr. France's opinions. His testimony should
not have been allowed. It was unreliable Hmmasch, supra at 398, n.7,
Speculative opinions are simply not admissible. Rimmasch. suprc^ . in.-..
Brewer, supra. Sec Sidle r JU'iidcrgnts*^ \u/>hi (psubmtnsts tes * ^ *-

..-. supra;
i-v • 'v "'-, t

relied upon too i nany i inknow n facts); Ostler v. Aldina Transfer Co., Inc.5 sup? a (expert
opinion excluded because based, in part, on speculation as to facts).
NY testimony was ever given that V/OLJ-W >uppon the proposition mat an minact speed
can be UV.JUI\IU

^^

-r .

•> ' /. ••

,-

.

-*

. «.^

. ...

: .

i.i ' "•' Tr^Iiabie or mons do not meet the requirements ol Rule 702

for admission of scientific testimony; as defined in Rimmasch. They are inadmissablc under
Rule 702, Rimmasch, supra; Brewer, supra; Tittsworth, supra.
• POIN I HI
THi EXPERT 1 ESTIMON Y OF PAI JL FRANCE WAS NOT RELEVANT AN 1}
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
i:\eii ••

is assumed ,KH ijic ^ak^ ..-: argument that Starks established a proper

and should not have been presented to the jury
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Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
To be relevant, evidence must have a tendency to make the existence of a fact of
consequence more or less probable, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, LTD. v. Smith's Food
& Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah
2000).
While it is true that evidence with the slightest probative value is relevant, where there
is no probative value to a fact at issue, offered evidence is irrelevant and immaterial. State v.
Smedley, 61 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Utah App. 2003).
The probative value of evidence is determined on the basis of need and its ability to
make the existence of a consequential fact more or less probable. Ostler v. Albina Transfer
Co., Inc., supra; State v. Johns, supra. Where the evidence goes to an issue which has already
been decided, it must be excluded as irrelevant. Ostler, supra at 499.
In the present case, Dr. France said it was not probable that someone could be injured
in the accident. R321 at 136:11-23; 139:13-19; 141:7-142:1. He also admitted that he was not
a doctor. He leaves the question of whether there was, in fact, an injury to the medical doctors.
R.321 at 116:12-25; 117:1-7; 142:3-16; 148:7-17;154:2-6.
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Before Dr. France testified, both medical experts testified that Balderas was injured
in the January 1, 2001 coliisi. >;s. \JY. \ ranee 'knew about this testimony, and said he does not
dispute Baidenis is.is ni|iiiul

R J- Mi ,il I h III1" I I1'1

/ ;.•;. '

,•.:,,

•;•' ' v . ;

'.

.

Therefore, he simply confused the \\VK h* xe-Ti fvnvj trial n v\asn"i probable someone
could have been injured. Such testimony :> oniy reiewur and miuenal if the fact of an injury
is an issue. After the medical experts agree that there was an injury, such testimony is
n;e:::;j:igiess.

Balderas testified that he was injured in the accident and sought treatment from Dr.
Iran. R.320 at 80-84. There was no c\ kicikv to the com, ary
Starks5 medical expert, Dr Chung, testified Balderas was injured ;.i Lik ^.cideih and
that he i eached 1\ II \ II fr< )•• :

.•

:

; •.

Iii determining the relevancy of the testimony of Dr. France, we must ask the question:
OHL. ii is established n\ Lineonicsled iestinu)n\ thai Balderas
was injured in the January 1. 2001 accident, does testimony
stating "it is not probable that a person world be injured in a
accident of the nature u inch occurred between the Balderas
and Starks vehicles on Januan 1. 2001" have an\ tendency to
make the fact of whether n.'tM'1*-?-^.-^ 'nr »;>.J «« •>-»-• -».-v-H^pt
more or less probable?
The answer to this question must be "NO," because once it is shown by undisputed
testimony that an event happened, the probability of such event happening is nwnniL

JCS>

\ a mathematical principle, probability has meaning only in predicting the
•Si... ^nooa of an event. ; >i France testified that using probability, one could est.iOlish
1-ri '--e. J --Mm event - v l ^ i snecific nuirh ^ -r-r-'-^n ;i p ^n ;• >pir nf \ -ou1-^' - : - !

^
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Such probability evidence is inadmissable. It does not make the established fact of an injury
more or less probable. State v. Johns, supra; Ostler; supra. Allowing such testimony is akin
to asking a meteorologist to testify on the probability it might not have rained on a date in the
past when all the eye witnesses have said it did in fact rain on that date. Dr. France should
not have been allowed to give an opinion on the probability of someone being injured in the
collision. Olympus Hills, supra; State v. Smedley, supra; Ostler, supra.
Clearly the testimony of Dr. France could only confuse the jury, and give counsel some
arguable basis for asking the jury not to award damages to Balderas. The testimony of Dr.
France was irrelevant. Its admission was prejudicial to Balderas. Its admission likely
influenced the jury to reduce the special damage award, and to only award nominal general
damages. Given the state of the evidence at the time Dr. France was called to testify, it was
plain error to allow him to give his irrelevant opinions.
CONCLUSION
Premises considered, this Court should reverse the Order of the Trial Court denying
Balderas5 Motion for a New Trial and remand this matter back to the Trial Court with
instructions to grant Balderas Motion for a New Trial and to set the case for trial.
The Court should also instruct the Trial Court that upon remand, Balderas' Motion in
Limine regarding testimony of Dr. France should be granted.

R.321 at 142-44. However, he admitted that once the wheel has spun, and a specific
number came up, testimony of the probability of the number coming up would be
meaningless, we now know what number came up. R.321 at 147-48.
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Respectfully submitted this

J J day of July, 2005.
Mel. S. Martin. I1 i

Attorney for Plaintiff'Appeliant
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 1

ilA-22—30b
protection

imitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal iiyiuin,

(l)(a) A person who has or is requii e d to ,ha\. a*. ^
• . :it coverage under
a policy which includes personal injury protection n
. maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal in .*•>.. alleged to have been
caused bv an automobile accident r^c^nt where rb r» - ^ r hn- sustained one
or more of the following:
ijj d e a t h ;

(ii; dismemberment;
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective
findings;
;rmanei;; ciLstiguremen!; or
^ • medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,00(1
(b) Subsectioi . \K.a, doc- ^oi ^pp"} i - i person making an uninsured
m o t o r s ! claim.
_Xa

iux\ jiibuic: ibbLiiiiL, petboimi

IUJUX^

pi * w

•* .

^

:a ,; . m^ part

..*a\ onlv exclude from this coverage benefit^
• i> for an} injury sustained b\ [he iiibuu-..; v,iui OL^UJJNUI^ another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a
resident famih member of the insured arid iu>i insured under th-_ poh-.v;
(ii) for am injury sustained oy any person while operating the insured
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the injured o r
while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii* to a* jniMv^ n : .-c 0 ] 1 ii the person's conduct contributed tu
inj~;>:

(A) by intentional!} causing injury to himself; or
, B • while u,)inmitting a felony;
(iv) tor an) injury' sustained in am pcis <;* arising ^ J I of the u^-w c: ^
motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for anv injury due n \\a
whether - : ::o* declared, ci/il \u,;„
insurrection, rebellion . .* revolmm ; *;; :c any ac: < • condition incident ic
; any of the foregoing; 01
(vi) for any injury res\*. - . troiii tiiu xaaioacir.c.. toxic, explosive, or
other hazardous properties o: nuclear materials.
(' h, The provisions of this subsection -do not 1 iiiii t the exclusion s v\ h ich may
be contained in other types of coverage,
, _ The benefits payable to any injured person u n o u

^OCLMJL

^ . A _.: 3U7 are

any DoneiiL) which that person receives OJ IS entitled to receive as a
iL-bUJt of an accident ..covered ir this code under .mv workers' compensation
r\r c ; i r r , i | ^ r S t R tU *O ' "x pieU2*

'**"* • '

(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from
the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on active duty
in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5)(a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as 'expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days
after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses
incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the
entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid
within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of
the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also
overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall
bear interest at the" rate of 1-%% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to
recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required
by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also
required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:'
(a) that where the insured under the policy is -or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer,
including the Workers' Compensation Fund created under Chapter 33, the
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.

R U L E 5 9 . NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
11) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jui \ or adverse part}-, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever an> one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance
or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be pro\ ed 03^ the affidavit of any
one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material tor the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced
at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damage a, appear my, in lu>» been given under
the influence of passion ui pr^judic
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to instif\ thi i m l n l 01 nihil ilt\i,i m nr
that it is against law.
I "M En or in law
(b) lime ior Motion. \ motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. Whui the application ior a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), 01 (4), it shall be supported by affidavit
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
I posing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either bv the court for good cause shown or by the parties by
written stipulation. 1 he c ourt may permit reply affidavits.
(ill On Initiative of Court. Nol later than 10 days aftei entry of judgment
:he court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
night have granted a new irinl on motion of a party and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to~Alter of Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
udgment shall be ser\td not later thnrs 10 A
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EXHIBIT ":

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICARDO BALDARAS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOT. IN LIMINE RULING/FINAL PR

vs.

Case No: 030904482 PI

JOSEPH STARKS,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

L A DEVER
September 13, 2004

rhondam

PRESENT
Plaintiff (s) : RICARDO BALDARAS
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MEL S MARTIN
EDWARD T WELLS
Video
Tape Number:
Disk 002
Tape Count: 1:07-1:25

HEARING
This case is before the Court for a Ruling on Motion in Limine and
Final Pretrial Conference. Court grants motion in Limine regarding
a hrg. outside the jury. This hearing will be held when
plaintiff's rest and before expert witness testimony of
defendant's experts. Court will give jury longer lunch or have it
at the end of the day when jury can be excused early. Plaintiff's
jury questionaire is argued. Court grants plaintiff's jury
questionare, with a few alterations. Counsel to submit disk.
Court will make alterations and have questionaire ready for the
Jury on September 20, 2004.

Paae 1 (last)

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 3

SE? 2 2 2004

THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
RICARDO BALDERAS,
SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 030904482
Judge L.A. DEVER

JOSEPH STARKS,
Defendant.
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find
the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "yes." If you find the
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if
you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any
damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Was the defendant, Joseph Starks, negligent as alleged by the plaintiff?
ANSWER: Yes X

2.

No

Was Defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff?
ANSWER: Yes X

3.

No

If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "Yes," state the amount of special and
general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the

injuries complained of.

If such questions were not answered "Yes," do not

answer this question.
Special Damages:

$ 333

Z

X
Total S
Dated this J£

°°
I

OO

/_*

$£$1°°

day of September, 2004.

A_/^L
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MEL S. MARTIN, P.C.
Mel. S. Martin (Bar No. 2102)
Edward T. Wells (Bar No. 3422)
5282 South Commerce Drive, #D-292
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)263-1493

Third Judicial District

DEC 0 6 2004
SALT LAKE COUNTY
D

«PUty Clerk

-LuPUTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

"WAGED

SHARED IN- REGISTRY

rcDGMENT

Ricardo Balderas,
Plaintiff,

m^m^

Civil No. 030904482

vs.
Joseph Starks,

Judge L. A. Dever
Defendant.

This action was tried to a jury, the Honorable L. A. Dever presiding, on September 20-22,
2004. Plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney, Edward T. Wells, and defendant was
present and represented by her attorney, J. Rand Hirschi. At the close of evidence, jury
instructions and closing arguments, the jury entered a verdict answering questions as follows on
the Special Verdict form:
1.

Was Defendant Joseph Starks, negligent as alleged by plaintiff?
ANSWER:

2.

Yes

X

No

Was Defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by
plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

X

No
Judgment @J

3.

If you have answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes," state the amount of special and
general damages, if any, sustained by the Plaintiff as a proximate result of the
injuries complained of. If such questions was not answered "Yes," do not answer
this question.
Special Damages:

$3,237.00

General Damages:

$
TOTAL:

0.00

$3.237.00

The special verdict was returned, dated and signed by the jury foreman. Upon objection
by the plaintiff to the award of $0.00 in general damages, the Court, at the request of Counsel,
instructed the jury that having awarded Special Damages, it was obligated to make a general
damages award. The Jury again retired to deliberate and returned with an verdict as follows:
1.

Was Defendant Joseph Starks, negligent as alleged by plaintiff?
ANSWER;

2.

Yes

X

No

Was Defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by
plaintiff?
ANSWER:

3.

Yes

X

No

If you have answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes," state the amount of special and
general damages, if any, sustained by the Plaintiff as a proximate result of the
injuries complained of. If such questions was not answered "Yes," do not answer
this question.
Special Damages:

$3,237.00

General Damages:

$

1-00

TOTAL:

S3.238.00

The jury was polled, indicating six of the eight jurors voted in favor of the verdict, making the
verdict proper. No additional objections or exceptions were made to the trial verdict before the
jury was released.
The court finds that plaintiff is entitled to recover prejudgment interest pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-27-44 on special damages actually incurred as assessed by the jury herein
at the statutory rate often percent (10%) per annum from the date of injury (January 1, 2001) to
the date of entry of judgment.
The court further finds that interest at ten percent per annum from January 1, 2001 on the
jury's award of special damages incurred in the sum of $3,237 through November 29, 2004, is
the sum of $126.78.
Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the court finds that the jury's award to plaintiff
should be reduced by no-fault benefits in the amount of $3,000.00.
NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is entered against defendant and in favor of plaintiff as
follows:
1.

Judgment is entered against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of

$238.00, together with prejudgment interest pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-44 in the
sum of $126.78 for a total judgment of $364.78.
2.

Costs are awarded to plaintiff in the amount of $627.35

Said judgment to accrue interest and be subject to costs of collection of the judgment
from the date of judgment until paid in full.

3

Dated this

day omwes^er, 2004.

0 > ^ U 4"^^

Honoral
District
Approved as to Form

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of November, 2004,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, the foregoing JUDGMENT to the following persons:
J. Rand Hirschi
Victoria K. Kidman & Associates
111 East Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTOF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

SERGIO PRUNEDA,
Plaintiff,

DEPOSITION OF:

vs .

E. PAUL FRANCE, PhD

COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING
CO., INC., an Oregon
corporation, and RICHARD
D. GRAY,

Civil No. 030402552
(Judge Laycock)

Defendants.

-00O00-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 22nd day of
November, 2004, the deposition of E. PAUL FRANCE, PhD,
produced as a witness herein at the i nstance of the
plaintiff herein, in the above-entitl ed action now
pending in the above-named court, was taken before
JEANETTE LUND, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing
at the hour of 1:25 p.m. of said day at the offices of
Dr. Clark, 2180 East 4500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to
notice.

Reporters, Inc. 10 West 100 South, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 746-5080 phone • (801) 746-5083 fax • 1-866-310-DEPO • www.reportersinc.net
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A

Okay, it's based again on evaluating

—

Q

I want to know the formula and I want to know

the numbers you used.
A

Oh, the formula?

No, that is an input.

That's where you would start.
Q

So you start by assuming nine to 12?

A

The assumption, again, is based on analysis of

the crush and then also looking at the testimony, but
yes, you start with that as an estimate.
Q

Were any -- did you do any types of

calculations -- I mean scientific, formula-based
calculations to get to those numbers?
A

To get to the nine to 12?

Q

Nine to 12.

A

Yes, I did look at -- well, it ! s kind of an

iterative process.

In other words --

Q

What does that mean?

A

In other words, you put in numbers and then

you run the calculations to see whether you get the
right changes of velocity that match the damage
profile.
Q

So that's one.
Just a minute.

I want to -- so what you're

saying is you just start running a bunch of numbers in
until you reach a result that you think sets out what
you're seeing in the photographs and the repair
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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estimates ?
A

Yes.

I mean, you start with an educated guess

to begin with so you're not running all over the place,
but once you get that dialed in, then it —

very

quickly you can narrow it down to the range that's most
consistent.
Q

Now, correct me if -- I just want to

understand this.

You're saying, I look at the

photographs, and I look at the repair estimates, and
I —

based on -- just on those two elements, I reach a

conclusion as to what?
A

Well, there's a third element and that would

be the collision tests.
Q

Okay.

So you take the collision tests, look

at the pictures, and look at the estimates and come up
with

—
A

Come up with a likely change of velocity that

would be associated with that damage.

And in certain

cases what you're actually looking at is the
thresholding, because I don't have collision tests
below a certain range.
through here —

And so when we're looking

for instance, just as an example that

might help clarify, if you take the 12-mile~an-hour
impact speed, that produces a six~mile-an-hour change
of velocity on the front of the Durango.
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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1 I
2
3

Q

Is that a different formula than what we've

looked at here?
A

It's the same formula, it's just you have

4

algebraically manipulated it so that the outcome is the

5

V rather than the delta V.

6
7

Q

So what you're saying is if we assume the

delta V, we can get back to the impact speed?

8

A

Right.

9

Q

And if we assume the impact speed, we can get

10

to the delta V?

11

A

Correct.

12

Q

But what if you don't know either one?

13

A

Then you're in trouble.

You have to have --

14

you have to input one or the other.

15

formula and determine the delta V with no V.

16
17
18

Q

You can't use that

So you can't determine the delta V unless you

know the impact speed, correct?
A

Correct, you have to make an assumption, an

19

educated guess, whatever you want to call it, of either

20

V or delta V to get the other one.

21
22
23
24

Q

And that's what you've done in this case is

made a, quote, educated guess?
A

Correct, I've looked at the evidence and

compared it and run the equations and that's how I get

25 I my V and delta V.
JEANETTE L13ND, CSR,
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1

anything to do with what we call the braking-far-ce-or-

2

is that something different?

3

A

Well, if he has his foot on the brake, it is

4

applying braking force to the vehicle and, as I said,

5

it can make the vehicle appear more heavy.

6

did the calculations on this, and he T s got the average

7

friction coefficient of .014 -- no, no, sorry, wrong

8

one.

9

And John

He shows no braking for the LeBaron in this

10

run and .01 for the Nova, which would be rolling or

11

coasting friction.

12

those numbers with a braking coefficient, you may move

13

these numbers slightly, one or two miles an hour either

14

way.

15

Q

So in this case if you were to run

Are you aware of any studies that have

16

measured the accuracy of determining either the delta V

17

or the closing velocity -- the accuracy of estimates of

18

either of those when all the estimator has are

19

photographs and damage estimates?

20

A

21

that?

22

Q

23

estimates.

24
25

A

Am I aware of any studies that have evaluated

That have evaluated the accuracy of those

I T m not —

not off the top of my head, I can't

think of any -- there has been some studies -- well,
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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I'm not sure if they're studies, but there have been
people that have written on that, the fact that there
can be a disparaging -- or a disparity between what
damage is produced and the kinds of velocities
produced.
I think as far as methodology is concerned,
there are papers relevant to the methodology that's
being used here, which is called a crush analysis.

But

I don't think anybody's accomplished what you had just
stated.
Q

Are you -- and I guess what I'm asking is, I'm

aware of at least some studies where they have asked
accident reconstruction experts to look at photographs
and repair estimates and determine, you know, the
closing speeds or the delta Vs, what you've basically
done here.
A

It is an accepted, common practice among

accident reconstructionists.

It's actually trained in

the Northwest Group as a proper methodology, but I
don't know if -Q

Have there been any studies to determine

whether or not that methodology produces accurate
results?
A

I am not aware of any that have been published

in that manner.
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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1

Q

Are you aware of some that have been^published

2

that show that there are, you know, significant

3

variances?

4
5

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
Q

Amongst what?

That they've done studies where we've taken,

6

for example, ten or 20 reconstructionists, shown them

7

the same photographs and repair estimates and have

8

gotten widely varying estimates as to speed?

9

A

No, I!m not aware of a study like that either.

10

Q

Do you know who the SAE is?

11

A

Society of Automotive Engineers?

12

Q

Yes.

13

A

Do I know them?

14

Q

Yes.

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Are you a member?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Are their studies peer reviewed?

19

A

Not necessarily.

20

Q

l r m going to -- I gave you —

21

Exhibit 4?

22

marked as Exhibit 4 and ask you if you have seen that

23

particular document before.

Some are, some are not.
have you got

Ifm going to hand you a document that I've

24

A

No.

25

Q

i would like you to turn to page 9 and 10,
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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1

which purports to be basically what we ? ve- just— ta-l-ked~

2

about, attempting to measure the crush and estimate the

3

mile per hour based on looking at photographs.

4
5

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
that?

6

MR. WELLS:

7

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

8

MR. WELLS:

9

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

10
11

Did you give me a copy of

MR. WELLS:
Q

Didn't I give you a copy of that?
I don't see it.

Here we go.
What page are you on?

Page 9 and 10.

And it would appear that we have, based upon

12

the same photographs, estimates of the barrier speed

13

ranging from the six- to ten-mile-an-hour range all the

14

way up to the 26- to 30-mile-per-hour range in the test

15

where they used a single photograph?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And where they had used

18

A

There's a table -- is that Table 6 you are

19
20

referring to
Q

—

—

Yes, Table 6.

And at Table 7, where they

21

showed the two photographs on the right, gave us crush

22

depths and estimates with speeds ranging from a low of

23

11 to 15 miles an hour to a high of 41 to 45 miles an

24

hour; is that correct?

25

A

Yes, that's -- the table shows that.
TD7\MrfrTir
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Q

Based upon these findings, would you say that

being -- that a person is able to determine the
effective barrier speeds with any degree of accuracy?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Before you answer that

question, I!m going to object on the basis of
relevancy.

It doesn't lead to admissible evidence.

Furthermore, this is a study that —

you're asking him

to comment on a study that he's not had the opportunity
to -- you haven't even give him the opportunity to read
the entire report and to look into the background of
the study to see if it's even accurate.
So with that, you can do the best you can.
THE WITNESS:

Can we read back the question,

please.
MR. WELLS:

Yes.

(Whereupon, the record was read as follows:
QUESTION:

Based upon these findings, would

you say that being -- that a person is able to
determine the effective barrier speeds with any degree
of accuracy?)
THE WITNESS:
question.

I T m not sure I understand your

Are you asking me to look at this and make a

generalization about the ability of someone to estimate
barrier speed -Q

Well, based upon the results that were

JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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obtained in this test, is a range -- does a speed
estimate range between 11 and 45 miles an hour tell you
anything significant as far as reconstructing an
accident?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE WITNESS:

Same objection.

It tells me in this particular

case where you have two photographs and that's it, that
it f s difficult to measure crush,
Q

You can't measure crush from photographs, can

A

No, that's inaccurate.

you?
I don't know what

methodologies were used by these individuals because I
haven't looked at the paper, but if you have the proper
photogrammetry -- photogrammetric techniques, you can
measure that.
Q

Okay.

A

But if you are saying estimate the crush from

these two photographs, I'm not surprised the variance.
I am —

I am pleased to see this grouping around the

center point, but I'm not surprised to see the
variance, if that's all you're looking at.
Q
proper —

Now, you just told me if you have the
what did you call it, photogram

—

A

Photogrammetric techniques.

Q

What are photogrammetric techniques?

JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR

70

EXAMINATION BY MR. WELLS
A

Correct.

2 |

Q

Do we know how much?

3

A

No.

But I know we're over the threshold of

4

the crash testing that I utilized to look at the back

5

of the LeBaron, so then I go to the Durango, which is

6

the impacting vehicle, and that's where I high side

7

that.

8

Q

9
10

But you don't know how much frame damage, how

much crush there was to the LeBaron, do you?
A

I don't know the exact numbers.

11

tell you how much.

12

can see that in the photographs.

13

Q

I couldn't

I know there was some because you

Are there any studies that you are aware of

14

that have measured the correlation between actual

15

impact speeds and impact speeds that are estimated

16

using only photographs and repair estimates?

17

A

I think I answered that question before, that

18

I wasn't aware of any that would be applicable I think

19

to this particular case.

20

Q

Are there any peer-reviewed studies that

21

discuss and accept the accuracy of calculations made

22

comparing actual damage to estimated damage based only

23

on repair estimates and photographs?

24
25

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
It's the same question.

Object, asked and answered.
He just added one more word to

it, peer review.
THE WITNESS:

Well, the literature that's out

there discusses the utilization of the method, it's a
trained method.

The accuracy of the method is based

upon the data that you have, and if someone who's
trained in the art knows and understands that, they can
get a range in which impact speeds occur.

The study

part of it, I don f t know of anyone who has studied
those exact parameters that you've talked about to see
the accuracy.
Q

And I'm not questioning that you may have

50,000 people that do this.

What I'm trying to get at

is, has anybody ever tested to determine that what
they're doing produces accurate results.

And by that I

mean, has anybody ever taken actual -- two actual -let's start with two-car collisions, where you've
measured with the onboard computer type stuff that they
use, where you have measured the impact velocity so
that we know what that is and then taken those
vehicles, taken pictures of them and done repair
estimates on them and handed those two elements to
people who use the methodology you're saying you used
and compared the accuracy of what they estimate to what
actually occurred.

Has that ever, to your knowledge,

been done?
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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A

Not with three cars, but with two cars,-yes-.-

Q

Has it been done with two cars of the type

that we're talking about in this case?
A

No.

Q

Are there any text —

are there any studies

that are peer reviewed that come to the conclusion that
the methodology —

the methodology that you have used

in this case will produce results that are accurate
within some measured -- with some measured margin of
error?
A

I don't know.

I can't answer that.

Q

You have estimated nine to 12 miles an hour?

A

Well, I've -- I have looked at all of the

evidence and that's where it fell.
Q

That's your estimation, okay.

What is the

margin of error in that calculation?
A

The impact is within that range.

It's —

the

error is within that function.
Q

And how did you cal —

how do you know that if

there have been no studies determining what the margin
of error is?
A

Because the impact points that I have in the

studies, those tell me when we're going to start to see
damage in particular vehicles.

And I have taken those

beyond what we see in this particular collision, so I

JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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1

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

2 I answered.

Objection, asked and

This would be the third time.
THE WITNESS:

Well, there have been impact

studies, car-to-car impact studies looking at the
damage produced at various impact velocities and speeds
and looking at how that sequentially increases with
increasing speed.
that.

There are studies out that deal with

And if I understood your last question, they

would address that particular area.
Q

Well, what I want to make sure that I -- and I

just want to make sure, ITm just trying to put you in a
box, as you know.

I want -- because if there are such

studies out there, I want to know about them, if you
know about them.

And what I ! m trying to get at is, at

least if I f m understanding what you're telling me,
there has never been a study where they have
compared -- where they have taken a number of vehicles,
crashed them at known speeds, then had those vehicles
photographed and estimated for damages and asked
reconstruction experts to give them the closing speed
of that -- that caused that damage and then compared
what the engineers estimated to what actually happened?
A

Not that I T m aware of.

Now, you have handed

me an exhibit for a study that seems to -Q

Seems to be doing that and has widely
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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1
2
3

disparate estimates?
A

Well, it does, but I don't know the parameters

of the study.

4

Q

And that's what I'm saying.

5

A

But other than that, I don't know -~

6

Q

And all I'm saying is that's all I've been

7

able to find anywhere and I just want to know if you

8

know of any, you know, where they've gotten better

9

results in than that, where they're closer in and they

10

don't have the wide margin of error.

11
12

Let me just ask you this.

Looking at that

Exhibit --

13

A

4?

14

Q

No, the one that -- the study that I -- yes,

15

okay, Exhibit 4, and turn to page 9 or 10 or whatever

16

it is there.

17

questions.

18

the low range and a 41 to 45 as the high range, okay.

19

There are seven

20

midpoint is 26 to 30?

21

And I want to ask you a couple of
Going to Table 7, we have an 11 to 15 as

categories, so

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I would assume that the

I'm going to object to any

22

questions about this study until he's had a chance to

23

read the entire

—

24

MR. WELLS:

No, I'm just --

25

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Let me finish my

JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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objection -- until he's had a chance to read the entire
study and understand it and do whatever research he
needs to do to understand it before you start asking
him about his opinion on the study.
MR. WELLS:

No, I * in not going to ask him -- I

just want to ask him a question
Q

—

What would be -- is there some way you

could -- that —

is there an accepted method of

determining statistically in something like this what
the margin of error is?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE WITNESS:

Same objection.

I thought I saw a bell curve

here -- well, no, this is where they're just describing
what statistics they used, the normal distribution, but
I thought I saw some statistical comparison here.

It's

just I haven't looked at it to see what they did and
how they applied the statistics.

In answer to your

question, I think there probably would be.

I don't

know whether that was accomplished in this study or
not.
Q
not?

Well, and that would be significant, would it
I mean, from 11 to 45 would be a significant

margin of error, wouldn't it?
A

Yeah, if that's -- again, I don't understand

exactly what was accomplished in this study, so I can't
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR
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1

address this study, but that's -- that's a JLarge

2

margin.

3

see the statistics to indicate that.

The margin of error per se, I would have to

4

MR. WELLS:

5

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

6
7
8
9
10 I

That's all I have.
I had a lot to ask you, but

I'm going to pass.
MR. WELLS:

Before anybody leaves the room,

make sure you've got all your exhibits.
THE WITNESS:

I would like to read and sign.

(Deposition concluded at 4:18 p.m.)
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ABSTRACT
When performing calculations pertaining to the analysis
of motor vehicle accidents, investigators must often
select appropriate values for a number of parameters.
The uncertainty of the final answers is a function of the
uncertainty of each parameter involved in the
calculation.
This paper presents the results of recent tests conducted
to obtain sample distributions of some common
parameters, including measurements made with tapes,
measurements made with roller-wheels, skidmark
measurements, yawmark measurements, estimation of
crush damage from photographs, and drag factors, that
can be used to evaluate the uncertainty in an accident
reconstruction analysis. The paper also reviews the
distributions of some pertinent data reported by other
researchers.
INTRODUCTION
When performing calculations pertaining to the analysis

establish values for a number of parameters, such as
drag factor, distances along roadways, crush depths,
skid lengths, and yaw marks. Some of these are
established by making measurements, some through
the use of tables, and others by using judgement. The
uncertainty of the final answers is a function of the
variations of each parameter involved in the calculation.
Though it has long been recognized that variations exist
in all measured data, including those related to accident
analysis [1, 2, 3, 4] very little published information
exists to assist the investigator in assigning realistic
input parameter variations.
There are at least three different ways to estimate the
uncertainty of reconstruction calculations.^
One
approach is simply to combine the parameter ranges in
such a way as to generate extreme high and low results.
Though possible, this situation is unlikely to exist in the
real world. A more analytical approach requires taking
partial derivatives of the constitutive equations involved
in the analysis. With these derivatives, the overall
uncertainty of a calculation can be estimated using the
Root-Sum-of-Squares (RSS) method outlined by the
Ml<^T r^l and HAmnn^frafpd h\/ Tuhprnpn Tfil However

jiven the complicated nonlinear equations typically used
n accident reconstructions, this can become
mpractical. Another approach, Monte Carlo simulation,
)ften provides a more convenient means of quantifying
he combined uncertainty. Monte Carlo analyses require
he assignment of probability distributions and their
>arameter values to the input variables in order to
ietermine the uncertainty of a reconstruction result to a
)articular confidence level. Several researchers have
demonstrated the application of Monte Carlo Simulation
echniques in accident analysis [2, 6, 7,8], but none has
discussed which probability distributions should be used,
ior have they suggested ranges that should be used for
/ariations that exist in commonly used parameters.
This paper presents the results of recent tests conducted
LO obtain sample distributions of some common
parameters, including measurements of well-defined
distances made with tapes, roller-wheels, and a laser
transit, measurements of skidmarks, arcs, and
yawmarks, measurement of crush damage, estimation
of crush damage from photographs, and measurement
of drag factors by several methods. This paper also
reviews the distributions of pertinent data reported by
other researchers in the accident reconstruction field.
Prudent application of proper distributions and ranges
can lead to more accurate accident reconstructions,
regardless of which approach is used.
STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
Notation in this paper follows proper statistical practice
in that X and s are used to indicate the mean and
standard deviation of a sample (comprised of a set of
measurements) and p, and a are the mean and standard
deviation of a population.
After systematic errors and blunders have been
accounted for in a group of measurements with one
variable, random measurement errors will remain. In
practice, random errors often follow a normal
distribution, or "bell-curve." The frequency function
describing this type of distribution is written as:

CJV2^

— f^ x — r\f i ortuorva u n i t

Two ways to determine if a particular set of data follows
a normal distribution are the use of a normal probability
axis and a Chi-squared "goodness-of-fit" test. In the
former method, one determines if the data follows a
straight line when plotted on a normal probability axis,
as shown in Figure 7. The latter test is used to
determine to a particular level of confidence if the data
is a sample from a normal distribution.
A
comprehensive description of this method is beyond the
scope of this paper, but can be found in most statistics
books such as reference [10].
A second type of distribution commonly encountered in
accident reconstruction analyses is the uniform or
rectangular distribution. This type can be used in the
absence of evidence to suggest that the value is more
likely to be near the center of the range. This distribution
is more conservative than a normal distribution, as it
gives equal probability to all values in the specified
range. At the same time, it precludes values outside the
specified range, so the bounding terms, (|i-a) and
(H + a), must be selected with great care. The standard
deviation for this type of1 distribution is equal to
[a / SQRT(3)]. The range covered by (ji ± a) includes
57.74% of all values. [10]
For a review of the terminology of uncertainty and
statistical
methods
associated with
evaluating
uncertainty in measurements and calculations, the
reader is directed to the references. [1, 5,10]
LINEAR MEASUREMENTS TASKS

In a normally distributed population, the measured value
falls within one standard deviation of the mean value
(|x±a) 68.3% of the time, as shown in Figure 1. The
measured value can be expected to fall within two
standard deviations of the mean (jn ± 2a) 95.5% of the
time and within three standard deviations (n±3a)
99.7% of the time. [9] There is no absolute upper or
lower bound to the value. This function has a total area
JWtm

otherwise stated, all statistical analyses in this paper will
assume a normal distribution.

E a 1

Where fi = population mean
c = population standard deviation

1 ~ - A U « «. ,*,^

Figure 1: Normal distribution, showing the area
encompassed by the mean plus or minus one standard
deviation (p, ± G)
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A series of linear measuring tasks were devised to test
the repeatability of measurements that required little or
no judgment regarding the location or dimensions of the
item being measured.
Uncertainty from these
measurement tasks forms the basis for better
understanding the errors involved in more complex
tasks.
Many of these measurement tasks were conducted
during the World Reconstruction Exposition 2000
(WREX2000) held in September 2000, at College
Station, Texas, USA.

SHORT LINEAR MEASUREMENT
Participants were asked to measure the distance
between two parallel lines printed on an 8-1/2 x 11-inch
piece of paper using a standard 25 foot carpenter's tape
measure labeled in units of feet and inches, with 1/16
inch graduations. Of the 28 participants, 24 reported the
length to be 4-3/16 inches. One participant interpolated
between graduations on the scale to report a length of
4.2-inches. Three participants, who reported they were
comfortable measuring in units of feet and inches,
apparently misread the scale. Two of these reported a
length of 4-3/8 inches, and one reported 4-3/32 inches.

Feet- I Feet- I Feet- I Feetinches,
inches,
tenths,
tenths,
Short (ft.) Long (ft.) I Short (ft.) Long (ft.)
38.50
90.60
36.06
91.60 |

["Actual"
Mean (ft.)

38.51

90.57

36.07

91.69

|

Bt Dev. (ft.)

0.025

0.061

0.017

0.060

I

6.7x10"*

4.7x10"*

6.5x10"*

Coefficient of j
6.5x10"*
[Variation
|
[Minimum (ft.) |

38.43

90.46

36.04 |

91.54

I

Maximum (ft.))

38.61

90.78

36.13

91.85

j

29

|

Count

29 _ |

I

29

|

28

I

FLEXIBLE MEASURING TAPES
Table 1: Results of measurements made
with two types of fiberglass tape measures:
feet/inches and feet/tenths.
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The distribution of these measurements appeared to be
normal. The summary statistics for all four tapemeasurement tasks are shown in Table 1.

CO

37-4

Two sets of three targets were arranged as shown in
Figure 2. Participants were asked to measure the
distances in the first set using a flexible tape measure
graduated in feet and inches. On the second set a tape
graduated in feet and tenths was used. Grass growing
between the joints in the otherwise flat concrete surface
was removed. The short measurement was nominally
36 feet (11 m) while the longer distance was nominally
90 feet (27 m). The "zero" end of the tape was held
under the measurer's supervision by another random
participant. There were twenty-nine participants. One
participant reported a distance of 36.63 feet in the shortfeet/tenths exercise which was more than 3 standard
deviations over the mean, and was discarded for this
analysis. The "actual" distances were measured with
the Sokkia total station described later in this paper.
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Measured Distance, feet-inches
Figure 3: Short dual-wheel "roller-tape" measurement task results. («=20, X =37.56,5=0.08)

Single
wheel
short

Single
wheel
long

Dual
wheel
short

Dual
wheel
long

| "Actual"

35.08

91.47

37.50

89.56 !

j Mean (ft.)

35.24

91.17

37.56

89.71

1 St. Dev. (ft.)

0.081

0.116

0.076

0.160 |

Coefficient of
Variation

2.3x10'3

1.3x10-3

Minimum (ft.)

35.00

90.96

37.42

89.42 I

Maximum (ft.)

35.42

91.33

37.75

90.00 I

30

28

22

Figure 2: Target arrangement for
short/long linear measurement task.

ROLLER WHEELS
On a set of flat, clean areas similar to those used for the
tape measurement task above, participants were asked
to measure the distance between targets using a singlewheel or a dual-wheel small-wheeled roller tape. Each
task in this series had 20 to 30 participants. Figure 3
shows the distribution of results for the short-distance
dual-roller wheel measurement task. The results from
the other three tasks had similar normal-appearing
results. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for four
small-wheeled roller-tape measurement tasks.
One data point in each of the single wheel tasks and in
the dual-wheel short measurement task was discarded

Count

-3
2.0x10"3 1.8x10

20

Table 2: Results of measurement tasks using singlewheel and dual-wheel roller tapes.

J

ean. In the latter case the reported length was 35.50
et, which appeared to have been a transcription error
i the part of the participant. The other two data points
ere just slightly outside the high 3-sigma boundary.
le dual roller wheel was also used to measure an
ctended distance over a jointed concrete surface, with
>me small tufts of grass scattered along the path. The
J participants in this exercise reported an average
stance of 124.98 feet, with a standard deviation of
19 feet, giving a coefficient of variation of 1.5x10'3.

by the arc) and the shortest was 30 feet. The reported
middle ordinates ranged from 0.625 to 2.25 feet. The
calculated radius ranged from 173.5 feet to 193.1 feet.
The frequency distribution of the radius calculated from
the measurements is shown in Figure 5.
The data from this experiment appears to be normally
distributed. Since only one arc was measured
insufficient data exists to model standard deviation as a
function of the curve radius.
8i

le distributions of measurements made with roller
neels appear to be normal. The standard deviation for
I measurements taken with several different roller
leels was larger than those taken with the fiberglass
pe but was still very small. A linear regression curve
using only the data obtained on the unobstructed
ived surface indicates that the standard deviation (in
st) of similarly taken measurements can be
iproximated by:

Sx = 0.0011x +0.039

EQ.2

,

*i;,

.• I• N
• ! .• .•

C

M

V
v

where x = the distance measured in feet.

IPTM's 2001 Special Problems conference, [11] an
periment was conducted to assess participants' ability
determine an arc-radius using the chord and middlejinate measurement method. In this experiment, an
: with a constant radius of approximately 182 feet was
ribed in white chalk on black asphalt, using a steel
"e pinned at one end and pulled with a steady force,
e intent of this process was to reduce the variability
sociated with selecting points to be measured on a
;s-than ideal tire mark. Each participant directed
lere a random attendee should hold the zero end of
* tape, and then measured the chord and middle
Jinate of the arc, as shown in Figure 4.
e radius of the arc was then calculated using:

„ C2 M
R=
+—
8M 2

EQ. 3

ere R = radius, meters or feet
C = chord, meters or feet
M = middle ordinate, meters or feet
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EASURING ARCS
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Figure 4: Chord and middle ordinate
for radius determination.
hteen participants earned out the measuring task.
ie participants chose a chord length of 50 feet. The

Figure 5: Measuring a chalked constant-radius arc.
(#i=18, X =1823 ft, 5=4.5 feet)
MEASURING YAWMARKS
A yawmark was created on a dry concrete surface by a
sport-utility vehicle. Participants were asked to measure
the chord and radius of the mark with little guidance as
to how to execute the task. Most participants used a 30meter (100-foot) tape to measure the chord and a 7.6meter (25 foot ) tape to measure the middle ordinate.
Participants were also asked to report the frequency with
which they had performed this type of measurement in
the past 12 months: zero times, one to five times, or
more than five times. The radius was calculated using
Equation 3, and a histogram of the results is plotted in
Figure 6.
Two data points (one high and one low) were discarded
because they were approximately 3 or more standard
deviations from the mean. The standard deviation of
the 30 remaining measurements was 4.6% of the mean.
To evaluate the normality of the data, the 30 data points
were plotted on a normal probability axis, as shown in
Figure 7. The data appears to follow a straight line,
indicating they are normally distributed. Additionally, a
Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit test (not shown) revealed
that at the 95% confidence level, the 30 points are from
a normal distribution. No significant variation occurred
in the measured quantities as a function of the time of
day.
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Figure 8: Layout for angle-measurement task.
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The setup for this experiment involved striking two chalk
lines on clean pavement. The seventeen participants
were supplied two 25-foot carpenter's tapes. Linear
distances selected on Side 1 ranged from 7 to 15 feet
The frequency distribution of the angles calculated from
this task is illustrated in Figure 9. One data point was
discarded for being approximately 3 standard deviations
from the overall mean.

CM

Radius, feet (meters)
Figure 6: Measured radius of yawmark on
concrete as a function of how often the participant
had performed similar measurements in the past
year, /i=30, X =188.4 ft (57.4 m), s=8.7 ft (2.7 m).

The data from this experiment appear to be normally
distributed.
Since only one angle was measured
insufficient data exists to model standard deviation as a
function of angle.
The average of the measures
correlates well with the angle as measured by a total
station oif 38.40 degrees.
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Figure 7: Probability plot of yaw-mark data.
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Figure 9: Angle calculated using two visually
selected perpendicular measurements.

MEASURING ANGLES
Measuring an angle with two linear measuring devices is
a common field task. This process involves defining the
two sides of a right triangle, with the angle to be
measured between one side and the hypotenuse, as
shown in Figure 8. An arbitrary point is selected along
one side, and the distance from the angle of interest to
the point is measured (shown as Side 1 in Figure 8). A
line crossing through that point perpendicular to Side 1
is then visually approximated, defining Side 2 as shown
in Figure 8. The length of Side 2 is then measured,
allowing the angle of interest to be calculated with

Mean, deg.

38.38

Standard Deviation, deg.

0.56

Coefficient of Variation

0.014

Minimum, deg.
Maximum, deg.

37.06
39.24

Count

16

Table 3: Summary statistics for angle-measuring task.

MEASURING DISTANCE WITH TOTAL STATIONS
Laser transits or "total stations" have long been a
surveyor's tool but have gained popularity in scene
mapping for accident analysis in the last decade. One
such device, the Sokkia Set 6E total station, was used
to collect data to allow an estimate of the uncertainty in
the sighting of a total station shot This measuring
instrument locates points via an optically sighted
electronic distance measurement device combined with
a theodolite that accurately measures the vertical and
horizontal angles to the sighted point. The resulting
measurements describe a point in a spherical coordinate
system. Rectangular coordinates are calculated with
trigonometry from the spherical coordinates.
The unit was set up at one end of a clear area. Each of
the 20 to 23 participants had previously used a similar
instrument. They were asked to sight to two stationary
prisms located nominally 74 and 536 feet from the
instrument Then they were asked to hold a polemounted prism over a target similar to those shown in
Figure 2 that was on the ground near each of the
stationary prisms while the total station's owner sighted
the shot. Standard 31-mm prisms were used at all
positions. Results were thus recorded for four groups: a
stationary near prism with many operators, a stationary
distant prism with many operators, a near hand-held
prism with many holders and a common operator, and a
distant handheld prism with many holders and a
common operator.
The distribution of both distances and angles recorded
appeared to be normally distributed; however, the effect
of transferring the points from spherical to rectangular
coordinates rendered the point distribution as an arc as
llustrated in Figure 10, which reflects the recorded
ocations for the stationary prism around the nominal
mean location (approximately 74 feet from the
nstrument). The tangent to the arc is perpendicular to
he direction in which the shot was sighted. The
iistance measuring resolution of the instrument can be
>een as the spacing between the three arcs, while the
angular resolution can be seen as the smallest repeated
•pace between points in each arc. The variation
ntroduced by the operators in selecting their shot
)osition can be seen as the total spread of points along
he direction of the three rows.
"he Sokkia instrument used was approximately 10 years
Id, and was capable of resolving distances in feet to
vo decimal places and angles to 10 seconds. Many
ewer models offer tighter resolution capabilities which
'ould affect the affect of instrument variability on the
pread of collected data. Even in this older instrument,
lough, this instrument-induced variability was clearly
k
ss than the variability introduced by the human
perator sighting to a stationary prism, which in turn was
ss than the variability introduced by using a handheld
ism.

-0J06

Direction of
Instrument

Distance
Resolution of
Instrument

Figure 10: Scatter (inches) over a nominal
distance of 74 feet with many operators and
a single stationary prism.
When the direction of the sight (and thus the original
spherical coordinate system orientation) is unknown the
standard deviation of the distance to the actual point
(forming a circle around the measured point) can be
expressed as:
sx = 0.00005x + 0.0204 (handheld prism)

EQ. 4

sx = 0.00006x + 0.0123 (stationary prism)

EQ. 5

where x is expressed in feet.
These relationships are shown graphically in Figure 11.
This standard deviation was calculated by resolving the
rectangular coordinates for each point, determining the
standard deviation for both dimensions in the plane of
the roadway, and then taking the square root of the sum
of their squares.
Length of shot, m
60
120

180
-^25

0.8
£ 0.6 +
>

Handheld Prism

53 0-4 +
0.2

—I
,
(_
200
400
Length of shot, ft.

600

Figure 11: Standard deviation of near and distant
points, with stationary and hand-held prisms.

Figure 12 displays the recorded data point locations for
the distant hand-held prism, showing a circle with a
radius of one standard deviation around the group's
mean location.
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Acceleration, g's
Figure 13: Peak lateral acceleration on slddpad for
78 common vehicles (n =78, X =0.80, s=0.056)

6.05 6.10 6.15 6.20 6.25
Distance East, feet

ligure 12: Recorded location for the distant hand-held
prism, /i=23, X =536.6 ft (163.5 m), s=0.068 ft (0.021 m).
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MEASURING FRICTIONAL DRAG
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The frictional drag acting between a vehicle and the
roadway is often an important aspect of an accident
analysis. This parameter can be measured in many
ways, including with whole vehicles, various types of
drag sleds, and "skid trailers." The results of several
methods are presented here.
USING VEHICLES
The American magazine Road and Track regularly
provides a summary of the peak lateral accelerations
measured during their vehicle tests using a 100-foot
(30.5 meter) radius circle.
Data from one such
summary were examined. [12] In order to accurately
reflect vehicles which might reasonably be found on
public highways, the analysis was limited to models with
more than 500 new US-registrations in the preceding
year as reported by Automotive News. [13] The
histogram for the 78 vehicles meeting that requirement
is shown in Figure 13.
Eubanks, et al, reported the results of a large number of
skid tests in which five or six tests were conducted with
each of eight vehicles. [14] Figure 14 shows the
average decelerations for each stop (identified as mubraking by some researchers [15]) as calculated using
data generated by the Mclnnis fifth wheel system. [16]
A large number of skid tests reported by Wallingford, et
al, reflected standard deviations of between 0.03 and
0.08 for particular vehicle/tire/surface/speed test
configurations. [17]
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' H a 6 0.62 0.041
5 0.72 0.053
5 0.79 0.031
( 3 d 6 0.84 0.079 j
1
l e 6 0.72 0.047
6 0.80 0.038
Hf
6 0.72 0.037
fflg
D h 6 0.78 0.081

•b
1 Dc

TOTAL 46 0.75 0.083 I

USING A DOT-SKID TRAILER
As part of a bus-accident investigation in 1985, the
National Transportation Safety Board measured the
"skid number" at 40 miles per hour (64 kilometers per
hour) of wet bituminous concrete and wet Portland
cement concrete on a section of Maryland highway
using a "DOT-skid-trailer." The mean of the 6,448 tests
conducted on wet bituminous concrete was 0.50, with a
standard deviation of 0.09. The results for 767 tests on
wet Portland cement were 0.54 B 0.05. [18] Other large
data sets of dry roadway friction testing have yielded
standard deviations of approximately 0.07g's. [2]

USING DRAG SLEDS
At two separate gatherings, participants brought their
own drag sleds for comparison on a common surface.
Data entitled "MD-uniques" collected by 20 participants
on a dry one-year old asphalt street [19] A Maryland
D.O.T. skid-trailer reported a drag factor on the same
roadway of 0.829 at 40 mph (64 kph). The data set
entitled MTX-uniques" included 10 participants working
on a dry concrete surface, which had an ASTM skidtrailer-measured drag factor of 0.846 at 22 mph (35
kph), 0.802 at 31 mph (50 kph), and 0.821 at 41.5 mph
(66 kph). [20]
Additionally, at the TX-event, 35
participants were asked to measure the drag factor of
the concrete surface using the same concrete-filled tire
drag sled.
In all three sets of data, participants
performed five pulls. The drag factor was calculated as
an average of the five pulls from each sled. Figure 15
shows the histogram of this analysis.
Experiment administrators noted a wide variety of drag
sled pulling techniques, including different pull angles,
pull lengths, and scale-reading points. The TX-generic
tests employed an electronic "fish scale" that is widely
used in practice. It was noted that participants had
difficulty obtaining a stable reading from this device.
Another significant trend revealed in the data was the
reduction of the standard deviation per pull number
during successive pulls. The standard deviation of all
fourth pulls was much lower than the standard deviation
of all the first pulls. This result is consistent with
"learned" human performance.
Subsequent testing with the same generic drag sled has
revealed that by reducing the variations in technique
noted above through a brief training, and using a quality
spring scale, the variation in measured values is
dramatically reduced. Additional research is ongoing to
determine the feasibility of generating consistent results
with drag sleds.
n xbar
HTX-genenc 37 0.67
HMD-uniques 20 0.81
•TX-uniques 10 0.81

60
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Measurement
Method

I

No. of
Samples

Average I Std.Dev.
g's
|
g's

Vehicles, skid pad,
lateral accel. [12]

78

0.80

0.06

Vehicles, locked
wheels [14]

46

0.75

0.08

Vehicles, locked
wheel, 50mph,
I
asphalt [17]

-100

0.76

0.08

Vehicles, locked
wheel, 30mph,
|
asphalt [17]

-100

0.77

0.08

Vehicles, locked
wheel, 50mph,
concrete [17]

-100

0.77

0.05

Vehicles, locked
wheel, 30mph,
concrete [17]

-100

0.75

0.06

Skid trailer, wet
bitum. concrete [18]

6,448

0.50

0.09

Skid trailer, wet
Portland cement [18]

767

0.54

Generic drag sled,
dry concrete [20]

37

0.67

0.04

Unique drag sleds,
dry concrete [19]

20

.81

0.03

Unique drag sleds,
dry asphalt [20] |

10

0.81

0.02

i

0.05

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for drag factor measurements
discussed in this section.

SKID MARK MEASUREMENT

S) 40-I
|

Table 4 shows a summary of the recorded
measurements and standard deviations presented in this
section.
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Figure 15: Distribution of drag factors, after

A locked-wheel stop was executed on a concrete
surface with a 1995 Ford extended-cab pickup truck with
no ABS. The truck was traveling approximately northto-south, and was equipped with a VC2000 which
reported the stopping distance to be 67-feet (20.4-m).
Participants were advised which direction the vehicle
had been travelling and where it had stopped, and were
asked to measure the skidmark made by the front left
tire using a flexible 200-foot (60-m) tape measure.
Ten participants measured the front skidmark as
requested, while 14 participants included the mark made
by the rear wheel, yielding a length approximately one
wheelbase longer than intended. The placement of the

fairly consistent (within an 8-inch span) while the
selection of the mark's beginning point was less
consistent. Table 5 contains the descriptive statistics for
the measurement results. The measured length of the
lighter rear tire mark was observed to decrease as the
day progressed, while the measured length for the fairly
dark front mark did not change significantly. Results are
summarized graphically in Figure 16.

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard Deviation
Count

Front+Rear
ft.(m)
72.0(21.9)
77.4 (23.6)
75.2 (22.9)
1.7(0.5)
14

Front mark
ft. (m)
64.0 (19.5)
68.6(20.9)
67 0 (20.4)
1.7(0.5)
10
|

Table 5: Descriptive statistics of skidmark measurements.
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Front and Rear Skids
y = -30 7 x + 9 2 1 feet
24
(-9 36x + 28 07 meters) J
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+ 21
20
Front Wheel Skid Only
y = -4 Ox + 69 1 feet
(-1 22x + 21 06 meters)

62

+ 19

59
12 00

13 00

14 00

15 00

CRASH 3 measurement protocol [21], a description of
the parameters to be measured, the vehicle's onginal
overall length, overall width, and wheelbase.
The equipment made available was an adjustable
rectangular frame on the ground that could be used as a
reference, if desired. Two measuring devices were
provided: a 16-foot (5-m) steel rollup tape measure and
a 6-foot (2-m) folding carpenter's ruler. A plumb bob
was also available.
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|

Figure 17: Damaged Astro-van with measurement jig
for direct crush measurement experiment.

18
16 00

Time of measurement
Figure 16: Measured skid length as a function
of time of day. Trendlines use "x" equal to the
fraction of the day, noon=0.5.

A review of the data showed that three participants
recorded the data backwards. After reversing the order
of their data points, the 17 crush profiles are shown in
Figure 18. Using a weighted average which considers
only half the value of the end points, the average crush
depth recorded by the 17 participants ranged from 11.8
to 34 inches, with an average of 19.4 inches and a
standard deviation of 5.2 inches. The reported length of
the damage area ranged from 45 to 78 inches, with an
average of 62.4 inches and a standard deviation of 9.9
inches.
150

MEASURING VEHICLE CRUSH
The amount of deformation a vehicle sustains is often of
interest to a reconstructionist conducting an energybased accident analysis. While the vehicle itself is
sometimes available for measurement, ^constructionists are occasionally asked to determine deformation
depths from one or more photographs. Experiments
examining the variation involved in each of these
methods of crush measurement and estimation are
described below.

+ 120

CO

s
£
a>
o

DIRECT MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGED VEHICLE
Participants were provided a Chevrolet Astro van,
shown in Figure 17, which had been involved in a partial
overlap frontal impact. They were given a data sheet
(Shown in APPENDIX A) on which to record their
mp^qurpmpnts which included a description of the

C1

C2

C3

C4

C5

Crush Measurement ID
Figure 18: Residual crush measurement
profiles recorded by 17 participants.

CRUSH ESTIMATES FROM PHOTOGRAPHS
Participants were asked to estimate the crush and or
Equivalent Barrier Spe^d (EBS) of a vehicle from a
single -photograph (Figure 19) or a set of two
photographs (Figures 20a, and 20b) without any
additional information.
In the single-photograph
exercise, 57 participants provided 11 crush estimates
and 49 EBS estimates. The average estimated crush
was 13.6 inches with a standard deviation of 4.2 inches.
The EBS results are given in Table 6.

Figures 20a and 20b: Two photographs used together for
one crush estimation exercise.
Figure 19: Single photograph used for speed/crush
estimate.
EBS, mph (kph)
6-10(9.7-16.1)
11-15(17.7-24.2)
j 16-20 (25.8-32.2)
21 - 25 (33.8-40.3)
26-30(41.9-48.3)

# of responses
2
12
16
14
5

CONCLUSIONS

Table 6: Crush estimatesfroma single photograph.
In the two-photograph exercise, 52 participants provided
8 crush estimates and 51 EBS estimates. The average
estimated crush was 13.1 inches with a standard
deviation of 3.3 inches. The EBS results are given in
Table 7.

I

EBS, mph (kph)
11-15(17.7-24.2)
16-20(25.8-32.2)
21-25 (33.8 - 40.3)
26-30(41.9-48.3)
I 31-35(49.9-56.4)
36-40(58.0-64.4)
41 - 45 (66.0 - 72.5)

# of responses
5
12
18
12
3
0

1

I

Table 7: Crush depth estimates from two photographs.
Most of the participants in this exercise reported that
they would not attempt to use information generated in
this fashion in a reconstruction without additional details
and analysis.

This paper presents the results of a variety of
experiments designed to quantify the uncertainty in
some measuring tasks commonly faced by accident
reconstructionists. Modelling the probability of many
accident reconstruction variables as normally distributed
appears to be appropriate. The standard deviations
from many common measurement tasks were
presented. These data can help determine appropriate
ranges for variables used in accident reconstruction
uncertainty analyses.
When making measurements that have been shown
here to have very small standard deviations, an
investigator may be comfortable making a single
measurement. When making measurements that have
been shown to have large standard deviations, though,
an investigator may wish to consider making several
repeated measurements to generate a distribution from
which a centered value can be selected.
In the one measurement task with a large standard
deviation in which the root causes were studied (drag
sleds), lack of standardized training was found to be a
significant issue that affected the toors repeatability. It
seems apparent from the results presented in this paper
that repeatability of some other tasks common to
accident reconstruction would improve with standardized
protocols.
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